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A BRIEF SUMMARY OF DECISIONS FROM THE ARKANSAS
SUPREME COURT AFFECTING GAYS AND LESBIANS
Anthony L. McMullen, J.D.*
In Arkansas, the gay and lesbian civil-rights movement has found vic-
tories in an unlikely place: the Arkansas judiciary. According to a recent
poll, fifty percent of Arkansans believe there should be no legal recognition,
including no recognition in the form of a civil union or domestic-partnership
rights, of a same-sex couple's relationship.' Additionally, Arkansas is one of
thirty states with constitutional language defining marriage as the legal un-
ion between a man and a woman.2 Yet, over the last ten years, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has handed down opinions protecting same-sex couples'
rights.
First, in 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jegley
v. Picado,3 striking down a criminal statute proscribing same-sex sodomy
and holding that the state's constitution protected private, consensual, non-
commercial acts of sexual intimacy. One year later, in Taylor v. Taylor,4 the
court reversed an order modifying custody where that order was based, in
part, on the alleged negative perception resulting from the child's mother
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas; Ad-
junct Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law; former law clerk to the Honorable
Wendell L. Griffen, Arkansas Court of Appeals and the Honorable Waymond M. Brown,
Arkansas Court of Appeals.
1. Janine A. Parry & Bill Schreckhise, The Arkansas Poll, 2011 Summary Report, at 4,
http://www.uark.edu/depts/plscinfo/partners/arkpoll/1 1/2011%20Arkansas%20Poll%20sum
mary%20report.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). That same poll showed that twenty-three
percent of Arkansans believe that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, and twenty
percent of Arkansans, while not agreeing that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry,
support allowing same-sex couples to form civil unions or domestic partnerships. In compari-
son, according to an April 2011 CNN poll, fifty-one percent of Americans believe that same-
sex marriages should be recognized by the law, with the same rights as traditional marriages.
April 19, 2011 Poll, CNN Opinion Research Corporation,
http://i2.cdn.tumer.com/cnn/20l1 /images/04/19/rel6h.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). A May
2011 Gallup poll put the number supporting same-sex marriage at fifty-three percent. For
First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, Gallup,
http://www.gallup.compoll/147662/First-Time-Majority-Americans-Favor-Legal-Gay-
Marriage.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
2. For an overview, see Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Same-Sex Marriage,
Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011). Arkansas passed its amendment barring recognition of same-sex mar-
riages in 2004. See ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII § 1.
3. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002) ("Picado If').
4. 353 Ark. 69, 110 S.W.3d 731 (2003).
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allowing a lesbian to live with her. Then, in 2011 (seven years after Arkan-
sas voters approved a marriage amendment), the Arkansas Supreme Court
decided Bethany v. Jones5 and allowed a former same-sex partner of a
mother to have visitation with her former partner's biological child, whom
the couple had originally agreed to raise together. Months later, in the much
anticipated decision of Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Cole,6
the Supreme Court struck down a voter-initiated act prohibiting unmarried,
cohabiting couples from adopting or fostering children. While the law ap-
plied equally to homosexuals and heterosexuals, the transparent objective of
the law was to keep gays and lesbians from adopting or fostering children.7
This article briefly discusses these four cases. In each case, the Arkansas
Supreme Court could have come to opposite conclusions. Instead, the court
forged a path that gives at least some protection to same-sex couples and
their families.
I. JEGLEY V. PICADO
8
Jegley v. Picado is a case about sexual freedom, but as evidenced by
rulings that followed, it had far-reaching implications. At issue was Arkan-
sas's law criminalizing same-sex sodomy:9
(a) A person commits sodomy if such person performs any act of sexual
gratification involving:
(1) The penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of an animal or
a person by the penis of a person of the same sex or an animal; or
(2) The penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of an animal or
a person by any body member of a person of the same sex or an animal.
(b) Sodomy is a Class A misdemeanor.
As a Class A misdemeanor, a criminal conviction carried a penalty of
up to one year in jail and a $1000 fine.' ° Until 1961, all fifty states outlawed
some form of sodomy. 1 By 1986, when the Supreme Court of the United
States initially held that there was no federal constitutional right to homo-
sexual sodomy,12 only twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia con-
5. 2011 Ark. 67,- S.W.3d _.
6. 2011 Ark. 145, - S.W.3d .
7. See infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
8. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
9. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997).
10. 349 Ark. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-201, 5-4-401
(Michie Repl. 1997)).
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. See id. at 190-96.
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tinued to provide criminal penalties for sodomy. 3 By the time the matter
was before the Arkansas Supreme Court in 2002, twenty-six states plus the
District of Columbia had legislatively repealed their sodomy laws. 4 Nine
states had invalidated their laws by judicial decision. 5 Six states, including
Arkansas, maintained "same-sex" sodomy laws, 16 while nine states plus
Puerto Rico had statutes proscribing both "same-sex and opposite-sex"
sodomy."
Before the Picado court invalidated Arkansas's sodomy law, there
were three attempts to legislatively eliminate the law;' 8 none were success-
ful. The judicial effort to eliminate the statute began in January 1998, when
seven Arkansans filed a complaint in Pulaski County Chancery Court. 9
(The case was later transferred to the circuit court after the Arkansas Su-
preme Court held the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to consider the mat-
ter.)20 All plaintiffs alleged that they intended to commit acts that would
violate the sodomy statute, and all feared prosecution.2 ' They also alleged
collateral harms as a result of the sodomy statute, most of which were based
on the fact that they intended to do something that would be considered
criminal behavior.22 In addition to specific anti-gay sentiment, which they
attributed to the sodomy law, the plaintiffs submitted affidavits showing
how the sodomy statute personally affected them. In March 2001, the circuit
court found that the sodomy statute violated the rights to privacy and equal
13. Id. at 193-94 (citing Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et at., Survey on the Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Context of HomosexualActivity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 524 n.9 (1986)).
14. Picado 11, 349 Ark. at 625-26 n.4, 80 S.W.3d at 345-46 n.4 (citing legislative acts in
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming).
15. Id. (citing cases from Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee).
16. Id. (citing statues from Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Texas).
17. Id. (citing statutes from Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia).
18. See S.B. 378, 80th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1995) (replacing the sodomy
statute with a statute criminalizing bestiality); S.B. 565, 79th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
1993) (replacing the sodomy statute with a statute criminalizing bestiality); S.B. 125, 78th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1991) (limiting the definition of sodomy to acts of sexual
gratification with an animal).
19. Appellees' Supplemental Abstract, Brief, & Supplemental Addendum, at SA 1-SA
12, Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.2d 332 (2002). (No. 01-815) [hereinafter Appel-
lees' Brief, Picado I1].
20. Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 232, 996 S.W.2d 17, 19 (1999) ("Picado ").
21. Appellees' Brief, Picado H, supra note 19, at SA 2-SA 5.
22. Id. at SA 9.
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protection under the Arkansas Constitution, 23 and the State appealed to the
Arkansas Supreme Court.
The Picado plaintiffs' first hurdle was to show that they had standing
to litigate the issue. In motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the
State argued that the case presented no justiciable controversy.24 While the
State acknowledged that it had the authority to prosecute violations of the
statute, it argued that there had been no prosecution attempted or threatened
against these specific plaintiffs. 25 The State noted that there was no reported
Arkansas case in the previous seventy years where the state prosecuted
someone for engaging in private, consensual, sexual conduct between
adults.26 It also argued that any fear of the collateral harms alleged by the
plaintiffs were insufficient to give the plaintiffs standing to challenge the
sodomy suit. 27 The State maintained this argument before the state Supreme
Court.
28
The Court accepted the plaintiffs' arguments and held that they had
standing to challenge the sodomy law. First, it noted the previous failed at-
tempts to repeal the statute, "sending a signal to prosecutors of the statute's
continuing vitality. '29 According to the Court, the State was not disavowing
the legitimacy of the statute, as evidenced by its vigorous defense of the
statute.3° More importantly, the Court recognized the implications of the
statute and recognized that the statute had been used outside the criminal
context.3' For example, in Stowe v. Bowlin,32 the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the lower court should have allowed the appellant to impeach the
appellee's credibility as a witness by referencing the appellee's admitted
23. Appellants' Supplement Brief & Addendum, at A 278-A 288, Picado H, 349 Ark.
600, 80 S.W.2d 332 (No. 1 -815) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief, Picado 1l].
24. Appellant's Brief, Picado H, supra note 23, at 1-8.
25. ld.atA14-A15.
26. Id. at A 15. Though this was not the first time the sodomy statute had been chal-
lenged in an Arkansas state court, previous challenges involved public conduct. See Carter v.
State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973) (enforcing sodomy statute against an act com-
mitted in an automobile parked 120 to 140 yards off the interstate and in an area described as
"quite crowded"); Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114 (1973) (enforcing sodomy
statute against an act committed in an automobile on a public road near Interstate 30 against a
minor).
27. Appellant's Brief, Picado II, supra note 23, at A18-A19 (Supplemental Brief in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 9).
28. The circuit court found that the claim was justiciable per the Supreme Court's ruling
in Picado I. However, the Supreme Court stated that Picado I was limited to whether the
chancery court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the statute. Picado 11, 349
Ark. at 612, 80 S.W.3d at 336-37. Thus, the circuit court reached the right result, but for the
wrong reason.
29. Id. at 621, 80 S.W.3d at 342.
30. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 342-43.
31. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 343.
32. 259 Ark. 221, 224-25 531 S.W.2d 955, 957-58 (1976).
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engagement in sodomy. And in Thigpen v. Carpenter,33 the Arkansas Court
of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's consideration of the appellant's homo-
sexuality as a relevant factor in depriving her of the custody of her children.
The Picado If court concluded:
[W]e cannot say that appellees are without some reason to fear prosecu-
tion for violation of the sodomy statute. To hold otherwise would leave
appellees trapped in a veritable Catch-22. As long as Arkansas prosecu-
tors exercise their discretion and fail to prosecute those individuals who
violate the sodomy statute through consensual, private behavior, appel-
lees and those similarly affected by the statute would have no choice but
to suffer the brand of criminal impressed upon them by a potentially un-
constitutional law. The discretionary acts of the State's prosecutors could
effectively bar shut the courthouse doors and protect the sodomy statute
from constitutional challenge. We cannot allow this to happen.
34
In other words, the court accepted the plaintiffs' fears regarding impli-
cations of the statute as sufficient grounds to give them standing to chal-
lenge the statute. Because those who would discriminate against homosexu-
als based on the criminality of their conduct relied so heavily on the sodomy
statute, it was very important to homosexuals that the statute be declared
unconstitutional.35
The Picado plaintiffs could not rely on federal precedent, as it existed
at that time, to combat the sodomy statute. In Bowers v. Hardwick,36 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that there was no constitutional
right to commit sodomy, even between consenting adults. There, the peti-
tioner challenged the Georgia sodomy statute, which carried a penalty of up
to twenty years' imprisonment.7 Like the Picado plaintiffs, the respondent
in Bowers claimed that he was a practicing homosexual and that the statute
placed him at imminent threat of arrest.38 The Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the sodomy statute violated the Constitution, stating
that the respondent's homosexual activity was a private, intimate activity
33. 21 Ark. App. 194, 198-99, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1987).
34. Picado 11, 349 Ark. at 622, 80 S.W.3d at 343 (citations omitted).
35. For example, at a meeting of the Child Welfare Agency Review Board in 1998, a
board member in favor of limiting foster placements to households with married heterosexual
couples remarked, "The state of Arkansas still has sodomy laws on the books. I am aware this
is currently under legal challenge but I agree with the law." Appellees' Brief, supra note 19,
Picado II, at SA 40.
36. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588 (2003).
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1. Under the Georgia statute, "A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." Id. (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
38. Id. at 188. In fact, the respondent had been charged with committing sodomy, but the
District Attorney declined to present the matter to a grand jury. Id. at 187-88.
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protected by both the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.39 But the Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that
previous cases conferring a right to privacy did not extend to homosexual
sodomy.40
In Picado, the State heavily relied on the federal precedent, including
Bowers, in defense of the sodomy statute. The State conceded that the Ar-
kansas Constitution might encompass a right to privacy more broad than the
federal constitution, but it urged the Arkansas Supreme Court to be "'reluc-
tant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended."' 4 It cited several Federal Court of Appeals decisions evaluating
laws affecting homosexual conduct under the "rational basis" standard of
review and rejecting the idea that discrimination based on sexual orientation
was the same as gender-based discrimination.42 The State encouraged the
Supreme Court to defer the decision to eliminate the statute to the legisla-
ture.43 The Picado plaintiffs, however, looked to the Arkansas Constitution
and its case law in arguing against the statute's constitutionality. 44 They also
cited decisions from other states (particularly Kentucky, Montana, and
Pennsylvania) as well as federal precedent.45
In addition to briefs submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court also
had before it two amicus briefs. The first was from a group that included
39. Id. at 189 (citing Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (llth Cir. 1985), and noting
that the Eleventh Circuit relied on the decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
40. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
41. Appellants' Supplemental Brief, Picado II, supra note 23, at 10 (quoting Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997)).
42. Appellants' Supplemental Brief, Picado 11, supra note 23, at 12-13 (citing Holmes
v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d
256 (8th Cir. 1996); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Steffan
v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985)).
43. Appellants' Supplemental Brief, Picado If, supra note 23, at 15 (quoting Carter v.
State, 255 Ark. 225, 230, 500 S.W.2d 368, 371 (1973)) ("If social changes have rendered our
sodomy statutes unsuitable to the society in which we now live, we need not be concerned
about the matter because there is a branch of our government within whose purview the mak-
ing of appropriate adjustment and changes peculiarly lies.").
44. Appellees' Brief, Picado II, supra note 19, at 8-10 (relying on ARK. CONST. art. II,
§§ 2, 29; Carroll v. Johnson 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); Coker v. City of Ft. Smith,
162 Ark. 567, 258 S.W. 388 (1924); Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853)).
45. Appellee's Brief, Picado II, supra note 19, at 10-14.
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religious leaders, congregations, and legal scholars.46 The group wrote that
there was expanding conviction in both religious and scholarly communities
"that the question of the morality of such conduct is a matter of private, not
public, concern, and that vital constitutional principles compel that the con-
duct be decriminalized. ' ,47 The religious and law scholar amici rejected
"public morality" as a justification for an invasion of privacy or a disparate
treatment of gays and lesbians, and they noted opposition in the religious
community to criminalizing the prohibited conduct.48 For example, they
heavily quoted remarks from the United Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.):
There is no legal, social, or moral justification for denying homosexual
persons access to the basic requirements of human social existence. So-
ciety does have a legitimate role in regulating some sexual conduct, for
criminal law properly functions to preserve public order and decency and
to protect citizens from public offense, personal injury, and exploitation.
Thus, criminal law properly prohibits homosexual and heterosexual acts
that involve rape, coercion, and corruption of minors, mercenary exploi-
tation, or public display. However, homosexual and heterosexual acts in
private between consenting adults involve none of these legitimate inter-
ests of society. Sexual conduct in private is a matter of private morality
to be instructed by religious precept or ethical example and persuasion,
49rather than by legal coercion.
The religious and law scholar amici also quoted favorably from the
American Lutheran Church, the Reformed Church in America, the Disciples
of Christ, the American Jewish Congress, the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations, the National Federation of Priests' Councils (part of the
Roman Catholic Church), the Council for Christian Social Action of the
United Church of Christ, the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the Unitarian
Universalists Association.5"
The second group of amici represented the fields of psychology and
sociology.5' According to this group, the sodomy statute stigmatized homo-
sexuals, reinforced harmful prejudices against them, interfered with efforts
to deter criminal conduct against them, and undermined public health goals
46. Brief for The National Conference for Community Justice, et al as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Jegly v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002) (No. 01-815),
(hereinafter Religious and Law Scholar Amici Brief, Picado Ill.
47. Id., at 1-2.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 6 (quoting Minutes of the 190th Gen. Assemb., United Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) at 265 (1978)) (emphasis added in original).
50. Religious and Law Scholar Amici Brief, Picado II, supra note 46, at 6-12.
51. The American Psychological Association, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lees, Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002) (No. 01-815) [hereinafter Psy-
chological/Sociological Associations Amici, Picado I1].
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such as combating the spread of AIDS.52 It noted that a large number of
people, homosexual and heterosexual, engaged in oral and anal sex53
(though the statute in question only prohibited homosexual conduct). The
psychology and sociology amici also contended that sexual conduct was an
important part of long-term intimate relationships for many same-sex
couples.54
In the end, the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the Picado plain-
tiffs and the amici. First, it held that sodomy law, as applied,55 violated an
Arkansan's right to privacy. The court observed that, despite the Bowers
decision, other states had relied on their own state constitutions when de-
termining the constitutionality of their respective sodomy/homosexual con-
duct statutes.56 After analyzing constitutional provisions, legislative acts,
and procedural rules that touch on the right to privacy, the Supreme Court
held that the right to privacy encompassed in the Arkansas Constitution pro-
tected all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy be-
tween adults.57 Because the sodomy law infringed on that right, according to
the court, the law was subject to strict-scrutiny review. 8 In other words, the
statute could only survive if the statute was the least restrictive method
available to carry out a compelling state interest.59 The State could not offer
a compelling interest to justify the sodomy statute; therefore, the statute was
declared unconstitutional "as applied to private, consensual, noncommercial,
same-sex sodomy. 6°
Ordinarily, this should have been the end of the court's discussion of
the sodomy statute, as a statute need only violate one provision of the con-
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 3-4. Specifically, the amici cited a survey showing that seventy-seven percent
of adult men and sixty-eight percent of adult women had performed oral sex on a partner,
while seventy-nine percent of adult men and seventy-three percent of adult women had re-
ceived oral sex. Id. at 3 (citing E. Laumann, et al., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES (H. Chicago Press 1994)). They also wrote that
twenty-five percent of American adults had engaged in heterosexual anal intercourse. Id. at 4
(citing S.N. Seidman & R.O. Reider, A Review of Sexual Behavior in the United States, 151
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 330 (1994)).
54. Psychological/Sociological Associations Amici, Picado II, supra note 51, at 4-15.
55. The sodomy statute also criminalized certain acts with an animal. There was no
challenge to that portion of the statute. Accordingly, there was no argument that the statue
could never be constitutionally applied. See Picado II, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
56. Id. at 625-26, 80 S.W.3d at 345-46 (citing Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d
18 (1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. State, 283
Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996)).
57. Picado I, 349 Ark. at 627-32, 80 S.W.3d at 346-50.
58. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
59. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 350.
60. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 350.
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stitution to be unconstitutional. 6' But the Arkansas Supreme Court also ad-
dressed the plaintiffs' equal-protection arguments as well. The court stated
that homosexuals did not constitute a protected class for equal-protection
purposes, but they were a separate and identifiable class for the purposes of
an equal-protection analysis. 62 Because the statute distinguished between
two groups of people, it had to be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose.63 Again, the Arkansas Supreme Court borrowed liberally
from decisions from other states and rejected the idea that the legislature
could punish same-sex sodomy while permitting the same conduct by those
of the opposite sex.64 Without a rational basis for the law, the statute vio-
lated Arkansas's Equal Rights Amendment.
The immediate effect of the court's opinion was "not only to invalidate
the application of the sodomy statute as the basis of a crime between con-
senting adults but also to end the practice of using the excuse of sodomy
laws as a means of denying homosexual litigants their equality before the
law in other matters., 65 The opinion, however, had a more far-reaching ef-
fect. Much of the legal commentary about Picado II was devoted to how the
case promoted an independent state constitutional jurisprudence. It was one
of three cases handed down in 2002 where the Supreme Court interpreted
the Arkansas Constitution to provide greater protections than its federal
counterpart. 66 In 2004, the Arkansas Supreme Court would depart from fed-
eral precedent again and hold that a request to search one's home must in-
clude an admonition that the homeowner has the right to decline consent to
61. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (observing that, because the law banning
cohabiting, nonmarried persons from adopting or fostering children violated the fundamental
right to privacy, the court needed not consider other grounds for striking down the statute).
62. Picado I1, 349 Ark. at 634, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
63. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 351.
64. Id. at 636-38, 80 S.W.3d at 353-54.
65. Steve Sheppard, Arkansas 1, Texas 0: Sodomy Law Reform and the Arkansas Law,
2003 ARK. L. NOTES 87, 98 (2003).
66. Ka Tina R. Hodge, Arkansas's Entry into the Not-So-New Judicial Federalism, 25
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 835, 851-56 (2003). Also included in the discussion were State
v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000), rev'd and remanded, 532 U.S. 769 (2001)
(per curiam), affd, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002) (rejecting Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996), and holding that the Arkansas Constitution protected citizens against
pretextual arrests); and Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002) (explicitly rely-
ing on state law to interpret the validity of the "knock and talk" procedure). See also Robert
L. Brown, Expanded Rights Though State Law: The United States Supreme Court Shows
State Courts the Way, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESs 499, 515-17 (2002) (also discussing the
three cases); Bonnie Johnson, Note, Constitutional Law-Privacy and Equal Protection-
Arkansas Joins Other States in a Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, Establishing New Protections for Arkansas Gays and Lesbians. Jegley v. Picado, 349
Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002), 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 681, 687-91 (2003) (dis-
cussing Picado 11 specifically).
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the search.67 And in 2009, one commentator opined that the Arkansas Su-
preme Court had become "comfortable using the Arkansas Constitution
[rather than the federal constitution or a combination of the two] as an inde-
pendent and sufficient basis to protect individual rights. 68
While Picado H was pending, a case challenging Texas's sodomy law
was working its way through the courts. The Picado II plaintiffs had actu-
ally used a news report of the Texas case as evidence of an imminent threat
that they could be arrested and prosecuted under the Arkansas law. 69 The
case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, which revisited its
decision in Bowers. 70 By this time, the statute at issue in Bowers had been
declared unconstitutional on state grounds.7' Other states, including Arkan-
sas, had followed suit.72 The Supreme Court ultimately held that Bowers was
wrongly decided and that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments protected private, consensual, sexual activity.73 Thus,
one could argue that the Arkansas statute was destined to fall. Even so, the
Arkansas Supreme Court's use of the Arkansas Constitution to derive the
right protected in Picado would play a major role in future cases. Thus,
Picado is an important (if not necessary) part of Arkansas constitutional
jurisprudence.
II. TAYLOR V. TAYLOR
74
Before Taylor v. Taylor, the Arkansas appellate courts had only a small
number of judicial opinions on the role sexual orientation plays on child-
custody determinations. While Taylor does not necessarily preclude consid-
eration of a parent's sexual orientation in a child-custody decision, it at least
67. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 474, 156 S.W.3d 722, 732 (2004).
68. Jerald A. Sharum, Arkansas's Tradition of Popular Constitutional Activism and the
Ascendancy of the Arkansas Supreme Court, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33, 83 (2009).
69. See Appellees' Brief, Picado II, at SA 69-70 (No. 01-815) (a copy of Brenda Rodri-
guez, State Court Throws Out Sodomy Law Ban had Covered Only Same-Sex Acts; Harris
County Plans to Appeal Ruling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 9, 2000, http://archive. Dal-
lasnews.com/cgi-bin/di-ning%2bNews%2bpublishingDocID%3d41.
70. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
71. See Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
72. In addition to Arkansas and Georgia, the Supreme Court cited Kentucky, Montana,
and Tennessee as states that had used their own state constitutions to strike down its respec-
tive sodomy laws. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (citing cases relied upon by the Arkansas Su-
preme Court in Picado I).
73. Id. at 564-79. Unlike the Arkansas Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United
States did not address whether homosexual sodomy was protected under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But see id. at 579-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that Bowers is still good law, but contending that the Texas statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
74. 353 Ark. 69, 110 S.W.3d 731 (2003).
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requires more than perceived stigmas against homosexuals to justify a cus-
tody determination against a gay or lesbian parent. Though the issue had
been addressed in several states before the Taylor decision,75 both parties in
Taylor relied solely on Arkansas cases to support their respective positions.
It may be hard to classify jurisdictions along the lines of their attitudes to-
ward homosexual parents, as there may be any number of factors other than
sexual orientation that come into play. But there is clearly a variance be-
tween the states regarding the role that sexual orientation plays in a child-
custody decision.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that homosexuality is not a
per se bar to custody and that "the key consideration is whether a parent's
sexuality has a negative effect on the child's welfare."76 Similar decisions
have been made in California,77 Indiana,
78 New Jersey,7 9 New Mexico, 80
New York,8' and Washington.82 The Florida Supreme Court specifically
rejected private biases against homosexuals as grounds to support a custody
decision.83 In Mississippi, a court can consider a parent's homosexual life-
style as long as it is not the sole factor in the custody decision.' Along these
lines, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed a portion of a decree that specified
the father could only have visitation without other unrelated adult males
75. See generally Elizabeth Trainer, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Cus-
tody to Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.R.5th 591 (1998).
76. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Berry v.
Berry, E2004-01832-COA-R3CV, 2005 WL 1277847, at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2005)).
77. See Nadler v. Superior Ct. In and For Sacramento County, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63
Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967).
78. Pryor v. Pryor, 709 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("[H]omosexuality stand-
ing alone without evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not render
the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have custody of the child.") (quoting D.H.
v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).
79. In re J. S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 492, 324 A.2d 90, 94 (1974) ("Although a
deprivation of the parent's visitation rights due solely to homosexuality would be unjustified
discrimination, this fact does not prevent or relieve a court from the duty of closely examin-
ing any claim where it is alleged that exposure to a specific homosexual parent may have a
detrimental effect on a child.").
80. State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't, 107 N.M. 769, 772, 764 P.2d 1327, 1330 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1988) ("We believe the sexual orientation of a proposed custodian, standing alone,
is not enough to support a conclusion that the person cannot provide a proper environment.").
81. Guinan v. Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 963, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) ("A parent's sexual indiscretions should be a consideration in a custody dispute only if
they are shown to adversely affect the child's welfare.") (citations omitted).
82. Matter of Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325, 329, 669 P.2d 886, 888
(1983) ("[H]omosexuality in and of itself is not a bar to custody or to reasonable rights of
visitation.").
83. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
84. Davidson v. Coit, 899 So. 2d 904, 911 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Morris v. Mor-
ris, 783 So. 2d 681, 693 (Miss. 2001)).
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present; the sole justification for the restriction was the father's homo-
sexuality."
This does not mean that a parent's sexual orientation is irrelevant, even
in those states where there is not a per se rule against homosexuals. An ex-
cellent example is the decision in Marlow v. Marlow from the Indiana Court
of Appeals.86 That court clearly considered the father's sexual orientation in
its decision to restrict the father from including the children in activities that
promote a homosexual lifestyle, but the evidence showed that the children
were raised in conservative, fundamentalist Christian home where homo-
sexuality was taught to be a sin.87 When the children were exposed to the
father's homosexual lifestyle (in the form of a conference that promoted
tolerance toward homosexuals and the father's discussion of his sexual ori-
entation in front of the children), the children started showing signs of emo-
tional distress. 88 Similarly, the Illinois Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of
Martins9 reversed an order denying a petition to change custody after hold-
ing that the trial court failed to fully evaluate the impact of the mother's
lesbian lifestyle on the children.90
Of course, there are states that are less favorable toward homosexual
parents. For example, in Bottoms v. Bottoms,91 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the social stigma of homosexuality justified a custody deci-
sion against a lesbian parent.92 And while the Supreme Court of Missouri
has held that homosexuality does not render a parent ipsofacto unfit to have
custody of his or her children,93 the state's court of appeals allows trial
courts to consider social stigma in cases involving homosexual parents.94
Over the years, at least two states' judiciaries have changed their posi-
tion on homosexual parents. In Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 95 the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania established a presumption in favor of a "traditional
family environment" and held that a homosexual parent bore the burden of
85. In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492,493 (Iowa 1990).
86. 702 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
87. Id. at 734.
88. Id. at 735-36.
89. 645 N.E.2d 567 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
90. Id. at 389-90, 645 N.E.2d at 573-74. But see In re Marriage of R.S. & S.S., 677
N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (describing Illinois' approach to child-custody cases
as "sexual orientation neutral").
91. 457 S.E.2d 102 (1995).
92. Id. at 420, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
93. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1998) ("A homosexual parent is not ipso
facto unfit for custody of his or her child .... It is not error, however, to consider the impact
of homosexual or heterosexual misconduct upon the children in making a custody determina-
tion.") (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
95. 496 A.2d I (Pa. Super. 1985).
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proving that his or her homosexual relationship had no adverse effect on the
child.96 That court recently overruled that decision and held that homosexual
parents bore no special evidentiary presumption in child-custody cases.97
And in Jacobson v. Jacobson,98 the Supreme Court of North Dakota af-
firmed a grant of custody to a heterosexual parent when the trial court de-
termined that both parents were fit to care for the children. Twenty-two
years later, that court overruled Jacobson and held that a decision to modify
custody based upon a parent's sexual orientation was clearly erroneous ab-
sent evidence showing that the lifestyle posed a threat to the children's
physical or emotional health. 99
Before Taylor, there was little case law directly addressing the issue in
Arkansas. The most significant, however, is Thigpen v. Carpenter. The
mother argued that there was no evidence that sexual orientation adversely
affected the children.' The court's opinion focused on the fact that the
mother lived a promiscuous lifestyle in front of the children. 0 2 There were
other factors, but it is clear that the mother's sexual orientation played a
major role in the decision against her:
The chancellor pointed out four factors he considered: 1) that with the
appellee, the children would be residing in the same neighborhood in
which they had always resided (the appellant's home was in Austin,
Texas); 2) that the appellant's educational goals would substantially in-
terfere with the time she has for parenting (the appellant is a graduate
student at the University of Texas and is pursuing a Ph.D. in biochemis-
try); 3) that homosexuality is generally socially unacceptable, and the
children could be exposed to ridicule and teasing by other children; and,
4) that it was contrary to the court's sense of morality to expose the chil-
dren to a homosexual lifestyle, and that it was no more appropriate for a
custodial parent to cohabit with a lover of the same sex than with a non-
spousal lover of the opposite sex.
103
One judge concurred in the decision, but specifically addressed the
mother's argument regarding her sexual orientation. Judge George K. Crac-
raft noted that (at the time) homosexual conduct violated the law and that
the lower court properly considered such a violation when making its
decision.1 4
96. Id. at 5.
97. M.A.T. v. G.S.T. 989 A.2d 11 (Pa. Super. 2010).
98. 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981).
99. Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875 (N.D. 2003).
100. 21 Ark. App. 194, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987).
101. Id. at 197, 730 S.W.2d at 512.
102. Id. at 197, 730 S.W.2d at 512-13.
103. Id. at 199, 730 S.W.2d at 513-14.
104. Id. at 200-01, 730 S.W.2d at 514 (Cracraft, J., concurring).
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There are two other cases before Taylor that involved homosexual par-
ents, but neither is directly on point as it relates to custody decisions involv-
ing gay and lesbian parents. In 1995, the Arkansas Court of Appeals handed
down its decision in Larson v. Larson. °5 The mother alleged that the trial
court found her unfit solely based on her homosexuality. But the court of
appeals noted other grounds for the custody decision (the mother and her
partner had engaged in sexual relations while the children were in the home;
the parties' daughter sometimes slept between the mother and her partner;
the parties' son had gone to live with the father by agreement; and the
mother was ambivalent toward having custody of the son)."°6 Judge Judith
Rogers concurred in the judgment, but she was concerned that the trial judge
placed too much emphasis on the mother's lifestyle." 7
Finally, in 2001, the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered Taylor v.
Taylor °8 (no relation to the primary focus of this article). There, the father
sought a custody modification and a contempt citation after the mother pur-
chased a home and moved in with her lesbian partner. Expert testimony
showed that the children would be best served by remaining with the
mother, but outside the presence of her partner.' °9 In line with that recom-
mendation, the lower court ordered the mother's partner to move out of the
home within thirty days."1 ° The focus of the Supreme Court's opinion af-
firming the order, however, was on the fact that the mother was cohabiting
with a person outside of marriage."'
105. 50 Ark. App. 158, 902 S.W.2d 254 (1995).
106. Id. at 161, 902 S.W.2d at 256. See also Holmes v. Holmes, 98 Ark. App. 341, 255
S.W.3d 482 (2007) (rejecting appellant's argument that the trial court's decision not to award
custody to her was improperly based upon her sexual orientation in light of evidence showing
that appellant cohabited with six different sexual partners (male and female) in front of the
child, despite an explicit order forbidding extramarital cohabitation in front of the child).
107. Larson, 50 Ark. App. at 162, 902 S.W.2d at 257. Judge Rogers wrote:
A fair reading of the chancellor's memorandum opinion reflects a decided em-
phasis on the appellant's lifestyle. In truth, the chancellor's own condemnation of
appellant's sexual preference is apparent from his written word. In fact, however,
the chancellor focused on the relative faults of both parties. It is because of the
comparative reasoning employed by the chancellor and its disparaging tone that I
have some hesitation in affirming the decision. Such reasoning comes perilously
close to basing a decision on punitive grounds instead of properly focusing on
the welfare and emotional well-being of the children. Nevertheless, upon my re-
view, I am not convinced that the chancellor allowed any one circumstance to
overshadow his ultimate determination that the best interest of the children fa-
vored a change of custody.
Id. at 162, 902 S.W.2d at 257 (Rogers, J., concurring).
108. 345 Ark. 300, 303, 47 S.W.3d 222, 224 (2001).




DECISIONS AFFECTING GAYS AND LESBIANS
In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Taylor v. Taylor. There, the par-
ties were divorced in 1999, and Ms. Taylor was awarded primary custody of
the children.' 12 Six months after the divorce, Kellie Tabora moved in with
Ms. Taylor and the children. Tabora paid $500 a month for living expenses.
Tabora was a lesbian, and she occasionally slept in the same bed as Ms.
Taylor, but both denied any relationship or sexual activity. A year after Ta-
bora moved in with Ms. Taylor, Mr. Taylor petitioned the court for a cus-
tody modification, citing his improved financial position and Ms. Taylor's
living conditions. In the hearing on the petition, Mr. Taylor called several
witnesses to testify that they were concerned about Ms. Taylor's living ar-
rangement, while Ms. Taylor called witnesses to testify that the children
were well-adjusted and unaffected by the living arrangement." 3
In the end, the circuit court granted Mr. Taylor's petition to modify
custody. With respect to Ms. Taylor living with Tabora, the court opined:
The plaintiff here claims the circumstances of the expressed sexual pref-
erence of Kelli Tabora and the fact that she and defendant slept together
for approximately one year requires the conclusion that sex occurs. But if
the testimony of defendant and Kelli Tabora is accepted as the truth what
is present here is that no actual inappropriate behavior but rather the ap-
pearance of inappropriate behavior exists. Is that harmful enough to re-
quire removal of these children from that environment? It would seem
likely that if it is generally known by friends and acquaintances that de-
fendant resides with and also sleeps with an admitted lesbian, that most
will conclude sex is involved. This assumption on the part of the public
would subject the children to ridicule and embarrassment and could very
well be harmful to them. Therefore, it is the conclusion of this Court that
residence of Kelli Tabora with defendant and the children even without
sex is inappropriate behavior and is a circumstance that justifies chang-
ing of custody from defendant to plaintiff. It is at least poor parental
judgment on the part of defendant to allow a well known lesbian to both
reside with defendant and the children and sleep in the same bed with
defendant. 114
Before the Arkansas Supreme Court, Ms. Taylor argued that the lower
court erred in finding changed circumstances justifying a custody modifica-
tion. ' She acknowledged case law upholding orders prohibiting parents
from allowing romantic partners from staying in the home while children are
112. 353 Ark. 69, 72, 110 S.W3d 731, 732 (2003).
113. Id. at 73, 110 S.W.3d at 733.
114. Jd. at75,110S.W.3dat734.
115. Id. at 72, 110 S.W.3d at 732.
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present,'1 6 but she argued that this case was different, as there had only been
a finding of the appearance of inappropriate activity. She noted the testi-
mony that her children had not been teased as a result of her living arrange-
ment, and she wrote, "The trial judge's conclusions, which cater to the lower
instincts of the public, do not go beyond mere speculation and conjec-
ture." '" 7 In his argument, Mr. Taylor relied on testimony from several wit-
nesses whom testified that they would not allow their children to be with
Ms. Taylor if she were living with a lesbian. He also argued that the record
as a whole, including evidence of his improved and superior financial situa-
tion, justified the change in circumstances.' 18
The Supreme Court did not exactly address whether it was proper to
consider sexual orientation when making a custody determination. Rather, it
framed the issue as whether it was proper to consider "a situation in which a
parent's current actions might bring about a future harm for a child based on
the public's erroneous perception."" 9 The court looked to cases from courts
in West Virginia, 2° Oklahoma,' 2' Nebraska, 22 and Illinois, 23 where the ap-
pellate court sided with the homosexual parent in the absence of any proof
of exposure to the relationship or harm to the child. 124 It also acknowledged
a decision in Missouri, where the court of appeals held that unrestricted ac-
cess to homosexual parent would endanger the child. 25 In that case, how-
116. Appellant's Brief, at 149; Taylor v. Taylor, 353 Ark. 69, 80, 110 S.W.3d 731, 737
(2003) (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 336 Ark. 379, 985 S.W.2d 724 (1999); Ketron v.
Ketron, 15 Ark. App. 325, 692 S.W.2d 261 (1995)).
117. Appellant's Brief, at 151.
118. Taylor, 353 Ark. at 73, 110 S.W.3d at 733. In addition to Ms. Taylor's living ar-
rangement, the Supreme Court was also asked to address whether the lower court could con-
sider the relative financial position and education background of the parties. The court ulti-
mately concluded that there was no material change in circumstances as it related to the par-
ties' finances and education, as Mr. Taylor was aware of their relative finances and education
at the time he entered into the initial custody agreement. Taylor, 353 Ark. at 79, 110 S.W.3d
at 737.
119. Id. at80, 110S.W.3dat737.
120. Rowsey v. Rowsey, 174 W. Va. 692, 329 S.E.2d 57 (1985) (holding that the fact that
the mother was associating with a lesbian was not a basis for a change of custody to the non-
custodial parent).
121. Fox v. Fox, 1995 Ok. 87, 904 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1995) (reversing a finding of parental
unfitness, based upon the mother's sexual orientation, in light of no evidence showing that
the mother's sexual orientation had an adverse effect on the children).
122. Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 6 Neb. App. 13, 570 N.W.2d 368 (1997) (affirming an
order denying a motion to change custody where the child was not directly exposed to the
mother's sexual relationship).
123. In re Marriage of R.S., 286 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1048, 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1298 (1996)
(stating "the potential for social condemnation, standing alone, cannot justify a change in
custody").
124. Taylor, 353 Ark. at 81-82, 110 S.W.3d at 738.
125. J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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ever, the parent and his same-sex partner were overtly affectionate in front
of the child.12 6 Despite these acknowledgements, the Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected the idea that a custody decision could be based on percep-
tions and appearances, rather than concrete proof of likely harm. 27 The
court concluded:
While we are well aware of the expression that "perception is reality,"
when dealing with the extreme seriousness of changing the custody of
children from one parent to the other, we are convinced that evidence-
based factors must govern. Here, there is not only the absence of proof
that a homosexual relationship was occurring, but the great weight of
evidence supported Rexayne Taylor's position that the boys were well-
adjusted and happy in their environment and had not been adversely af-
fected by her living arrangement. We, therefore, hold that the circuit
court abused its discretion in changing the custody of R.T. and A.T. from
Rexayne Taylor to Wes Taylor.
128
But was this case the victory for gays and lesbians? If the case is inter-
preted narrowly, then it might not be. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that it
would not tolerate a parent's unmarried cohabitation with a romantic partner
in the presence of a child.129 It applies this this rule regardless of the parent's
sexual orientation. 30 But because same-sex couples cannot marry in Arkan-
sas,'31 it would be difficult for them to have a committed relationship and
parent a child without running afoul of this rule. Assuming that the relation-
ship is long-term, one would assume that the child would eventually recog-
nize the existence of the relationship and its implications. Further, the Su-
preme Court did not repudiate any of the language in Thigpen, where the
court considered sexual orientation to be a relevant factor in a custody de-
termination. Taylor merely addressed the issue of a child being in the cus-
tody of someone who might be perceived, though speculation and innuendo,
to be homosexual. Arguably, the case is distinguishable if the parent actually
is homosexual. As one commentator cynically noted:
The message sent to sexual minority parents in Arkansas by the court in
this factually strange case is quite clear-to maintain custody of your
children, deny being a sexual minority and testify that there is no sexual
126. Id. at 788.
127. Taylor, 353 Ark. at 83, 110 S.W.3d at 739.
128. Id. at 83-84, 110 S.W.3d at 739-40.
129. Id. at 80, 110 S.W.3d at 737 (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Ark. 300, 47 S.W.3d 222
(2001); Campbell v. Campbell, 336 Ark. 379, 985 S.W.2d 724 (1999); Walker v. Walker,
262 Ark. 648, 559 S.W.2d 716 (1978)).
130. See Taylor, 345 Ark. at 304-05, 47 S.W.3d at 225.
131. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 1 ("Marriage consists only of the union of one
man and one woman.").
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relationship. Furthermore, if you happened to have been sharing a bed
with an "admitted" sexual minority individual, definitely stop sleeping in
the same bed when the other parent files a change of custody motion.
1 32
Some, however, are optimistic. In explaining the law, one treatise
author wrote:
[A]lthough the Taylor court based its decision in part on a finding that
the mother was not actually engaged in a sexual relationship, it also
seems to stand for the proposition that even if the parent is in a homo-
sexual relationship, a change of custody will not be entertained unless
actual harm to the child is shown. In addition, the court cited the princi-
ple that "[t]he need for a factual finding of harm to the child requires that
the court focus on evidence-based factors and not on stereotypical pre-
sumptions of future harm."' 
33
Despite handing down Taylor nine years ago, there have been few
cases to elaborate on its holding. Most opinions citing Taylor are for other
propositions. 134 Regardless of how far one can take the Taylor decision,
however, associating with someone who is gay or lesbian is insufficient, by
itself, to warrant an adverse custody decision in Arkansas. Problems may
arise if the parent is actively engaged in a same-sex relationship. Even in
such cases, however, Arkansas courts may require evidence of harm to the
child before ruling against the homosexual parent for no other reason than
sexual orientation.
III. BETHANY V. JONES
135
Bethany v. Jones involves another problem as it relates to homosexual
couples. When same-sex partners have a child through surrogacy or artificial
132. Nancy G. Maxwell & Richard Donner, The Psychological Consequences of Judi-
cially Imposed Closets in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes Involving Gay or Lesbian
Parents, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 305, 321 (2006). See also Jason Scott, One State,
Two State; Red State, Blue State: An Analysis of LGBT Equal Rights, 77 UMKC L. REV. 513,
523 (2008).
133. Karen Moulding, "Custody between legal parents-The irrelevance of sexual orien-
tation-Lifestyle and affairs-Post-divorce cohabitation," 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION & THE
LAw § 1:9.
134. See, e.g., Tanner v. Kadusheva, 2011 Ark. App. 379, 1 - S.W.3d - (distin-
guishing Taylor in light of evidence showing that the appellant planned to move to Oklahoma
at some point in the future); Sykes v. Warren, 99 Ark. App. 210, 258 S.W.3d 788 (2007)
(citing Taylor's holding that the parties' relative financial resources are relevant); Holmes v.
Holmes, 98 Ark. App. 341, 349, 255 S.W.3d 482 (2007) (distinguishing Taylor in light of
evidence showing that the appellant had six different sexual partners, both male and female,
in a four-and-a-half year period).
135. 2011 Ark. 67,__ S.W.3d.
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insemination, one "parent" has no biological connection to the child. So,
what happens if the relationship ends and the couple disagree on the custody
of the child? Does the biological parent have an advantage over the non-
biological parent? Does the non-biological parent have any rights?
Again, there has not been a uniform approach in this area. Some juris-
dictions have been willing to apply either the doctrine of in loco parentis or
de facto parentage when a same-sex partner seeks custody or visitation of
his or her former paramour's biological child. 136 Some jurisdictions, includ-
ing New Jersey, 3 7 Montana, 31 Pennsylvania,'39 Vermont, 4 ° and Washing-
ton 14 allow homosexuals some degree of custody or visitation rights to a
former same-sex partner's biological child. 42 California has gone so far as
to hold that a lesbian was a "parent," as defined by the Uniform Parentage
Act, to her former same-sex partner's twin children when she supported her
partner's artificial insemination and held the resulting twin children out as
her own (thus making the partner liable for child support).,43 Other j urisdic-
tions, including Maryland'" and Tennessee, 4 have held that homosexuals
136. While similar, in loco parentis and de facto parentage are two different doctrines.
See Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for Les-
bian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REv. 363, 378-85 (2004); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 502-09 (1990) (both discussing the
two doctrines in the context of providing parental rights to the non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship). For the purpose of this discussion, however, the distinction is not
important.
137. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 319 N.J. Super. 103, 112, 725 A.2d 13, 19 (App. Div.
1999) (holding that relationship between child and former same-sex partner rose to the level
of in loco parentis, but that the partner was limited to seeking visitation).
138. See, e.g., L.F.A. v. Ankney, 2009 MT 363, 18, 353 Mont. 220, 220 P.3d 391
(2009) (holding that same-sex former partner, who stood in loco parentis to the child, was not
required to show parental unfitness before allowing her to bring a parenting plan before the
court).
139. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 920 (Pa. 2001) (affirming the decision that
a former same-sex partner stood in loco parentis to the child and that the partner's inability to
adopt the child did not bar her action for partial custody or visitation).
140. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 47, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d
951 (2006) (allowing biological mother's same-sex partner temporary visitation of child born
by artificial insemination, because partner acted in loco parentis to the child).
141. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161,163 (Wash. 2005) (allowing a former
same-sex partner to assert a common law claim of de facto parentage).
142. See also Osborne, supra note 136.
143. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46 (2005).
144. See, e.g., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008) (rejecting the doc-
trine of de facto parentage and holding that a former same-sex partner could not seek custody
or visitation of her partner's child absent a finding that the biological mother was unfit).
145. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), (holding that




lack standing to seek custody or visitation of their former partner's chil-
dren. "'46 Courts in Missouri and Utah are also unfavorable to non-biological
parents of former same-sex couples. Under the theories adopted in both
states, the biological parent has the right to unilaterally sever his or her
child's relationship with the partner and end the partner's in loco parentis
status.
1 47
Recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the fate of a young
child bom to Alicia Bethany. She and her former partner Emily Jones started
dating in 2000, and they purchased a home together in 2003.'4 A year later,
they decided to start a family. They agreed that Bethany would bear the
child, because Jones was experiencing reproductive health issues. 149 Bethany
later gave birth to a baby girl. The child was given Jones's last name and
Jones's grandmother's name as her first name. 5° The intent was for the cou-
ple to co-parent the child.'5 ' The child would later call Bethany "mama" and
Jones "mommy.' 51 2 While Bethany gave birth to the child, Jones served as
the child's caretaker during the first years of the child's life. 5 3 Bethany and
Jones separated in 2008, but they decided to continue to co-parent the
child. 54 The dispute arose after Jones kept the child for over a twenty-four
hour period. 55 Before the court, Bethany alleged that she was concerned
about Jones's ability to parent, citing factors such as instability, depression,
safety of the child, and dishonesty. 56 Jones originally filed for guardianship
of the child, but she dismissed this suit.157 She then filed for custody of the
child. Bethany argued that Jones had no standing to bring the suit. The cir-
cuit court rejected Jones's claim that she was entitled to custody under Ar-
146. See also Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312, 333-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (Barker J., dis-
senting) (rejecting the majority's holding that an Arizona statute did not require a stepparent
to prove that he or she had a relationship to the child that was equal or superior to that of the
natural parent; the criticism was based, in part, on the judge's opinion that it had the unin-
tended consequence of allowing same-sex parenting).
147. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that same-
sex partner lacked standing to bring custody action, even if she stood in loco parentis to the
child, once the partners separated); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 812-15 (Utah 2007)
(holding that a legal parent could terminate partner's in loco parentis status by removing the
child from the relationship, thereby depriving that partner of standing to pursue custody or
visitation under the doctrine).
148. Bethany, 2011 Ark. 67, at 1, S.W.3d at .
149. Id. at 2, __ S.W.3d at .
150. Id.,__ S.W.3d at
151. Id., S.W.3dat
152. Id.__ S.W.3d at.
153. Bethany, 2011 Ark. 67, at 6, _ S.W.3d at__
154. Id. at 2, __ S.W.3d at .
155. Id., S.W.3d at .
156. Id. at 3, __ S.W.3d at .
157. Id. at3n ._1, SW.3d. at n.1.
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kansas Code Annotated sections 9-10-113 (outlining custody in paternity
actions) or 9-13-101 (concerning custody in divorce actions), because this
was not a custody suit or a divorce. 5 8 But the court recognized the decision
in Robinson v. Ford-Robinson,159 where the Arkansas Court of Appeals af-
firmed a lower court's grant of visitation rights to a stepparent who stood in
loco parentis, and it found that Jones could proceed under that theory as well
as the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 60 After a bench trial, the court awarded
Bethany visitation. The court recognized that the case before it differed from
Robinson only in the fact that the parties were not married (due to the prohi-
bition under Arkansas law).' 6' And it found that Jones stood in loco parentis
to the child. The court also declared that Bethany was estopped from deny-
ing Jones some rights.162 The circuit court recognized Bethany's right to the
"care, custody, and control" of her daughter163 and that, absent a finding of
parental unfitness, it could not award Jones custody. 64 But a finding of pa-
rental unfitness, according to the circuit court, was not a prerequisite to
awarding visitation. 65 After analyzing what was in the child's best interests,
the court awarded Jones standard visitation. 66 Bethany filed a notice of ap-
peal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 167 but the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered the matter.
One issue before the Supreme Court was whether Robinson and the
doctrine of in loco parentis could be applied outside the context of a divorce
case.168 Bethany urged the Supreme Court to reverse. She contended that the
158. Abstract, Addendum, and Brief of Appellant, Bethany v. Jones (No. 10-295), at Add.
14-15 [hereinafter Appellant's Brief, Bethany].
159. 88 Ark. App. 151, 196 S.W.3d 503 (2004), aff'd, 362 Ark. 232, 208 S.W.3d 140
(2005).
160. Appellant's Brief, Bethany, at Add. 15. Bethany also sought dismissal for improper
venue. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Bethany, 2011
Ark. 67, at 14-15, _ S.W.3d at __
161. Appellant's Brief, Bethany, at Add. 23 (Order entered Nov. 24, 2009).
162. Id. at 24-26. The elements of estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must know
the facts; (2) one must intend that her conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party
asserting estoppel has a right to believe the other party so intended; (3) the party asserting
estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party asserting estoppel must rely on
the other party's conduct to her injury. Id. at Add. 24 (citing Linda Elenia Askew Trust v.
Hopkins, 15 Ark. App. 19, 688 S.W.2d 316 (1985)).
163. Appellant's Brief, Bethany, at Add. 28 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66
(2000); Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 357-58, 72 S.W.3d 841, 861 (2002)).
164. Linder, 348 Ark. at 322 (citing Robinson, 88 Ark. App. 157-58, 196 S.W.3d at 508).
165. Id. (citing Robinson, 88 Ark. App. 157-58, 196 S.W.3d at 508).
166. Id. at Add. 29-30.
167. Id. at Add. 31 (Notice of Appeal).
168. In loco parentis is defined as "in the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged,
factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." Robinson, 88 Ark. App. at
157, 196 S.W.3d at 507 (citing Golden v. Golden, 57 Ark. App. 143, 942 S.W.2d 282
(1997)). After holding that an award of visitation was not contrary to Troxel or Linder and
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW
circuit court's reliance on Robinson created a third-party cause of action for
custody and visitation in Arkansas and that such an action did not exist un-
der Arkansas law.16 9 She believed that the circuit court violated her parental
rights and that she had legitimate reasons for restricting Jones's access to the
child. 7 ' She was concerned that the circuit court's ruling could allow any-
one in a child's life to sue for visitation (from former nannies to bitter ex-
boyfriends).' 7 ' She also contended that she should not have been equitably
estopped from denying parental rights, because Jones was not ignorant of
the fact that she (Jones) had no legal relationship to her or the child.
72
In contrast, Jones argued that the doctrine of in loco parentis, as dis-
cussed in Robinson, was applicable, and she cited cases from other jurisdic-
tions applying the doctrine to former same-sex partners. 7 3 She contended
that Troxel did not apply, because she stood in loco parentis to the child.
74
Finally, Jones argues that she satisfied all four elements of equitable estop-
pel, including the element that she be ignorant of the true facts. She wrote
that the unknown fact was not the lack of legal status between the parties,
but Bethany's commitment (or lack thereof) to allowing Jones to have a
relationship with the child.
75
The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that the federal constitution
protects a parent's right "to direct and govern the care, custody, and control
of their children.' 7 6 But it also stated that grandparents who stand in loco
parentis to a child are treated differently from those who are not.' 77 After
discussing the doctrine as it was outlined in Robinson, the Supreme Court
addressed whether it could be applied in the case before it:
[T]he doctrine of in loco parentis focuses on the relationship between the
child and the person asserting that they stood in loco parentis. Bethany
on the other hand seems to argue that because Arkansas does not recog-
nize same-sex marriage or grant domestic-partnership rights, Jones has
no legal standing to assert that she stood in loco parentis. In other words,
Bethany focuses on her relationship with Jones instead of looking at the
relationship between Jones and E.B. There is nothing in our decision in
that the stepparent stood in loco parentis to the stepchild, the Robinson court affirmed the
decision to award the stepmother visitation. Id. at 155-58, 196 S.W.3d at 506-08.
169. Appellant's Brief, Bethany, at Arg. 5-7.
170. Id. at Arg. 9-10.
171. Id. atArg. 11.
172. Id. at Arg. 12-14.
173. Abstract, Addendum and Brief of Appellee, Bethany v. Jones, at Arg. 7-11 (No. 10-
295) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief, Bethany].
174. Id. at Arg. 13-14.
175. Id. at Arg. 22-23.
176. Bethany, 2011 Ark. 67, at 8, - S.W.3d at - (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000)).
177. Id. at 9, _S.W.3d at__
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Robinson to support Bethany's assertion in this regard. Although this
court in Robinson noted the fact that the visitation issue arose in the con-
text of a divorce proceeding, this court stated that "critical" to its review
was the fact that the circuit court found that the stepmother stood in loco
parentis to the minor child. We reiterate that the focus should be on
what, if any, bond has formed between the child and the nonparent.1
78
After holding that the circuit court could award visitation to someone
standing in loco parentis outside of the divorce context, the court affirmed
the circuit court's finding that Jones stood in loco parentis to the child and
that it was in the child's best interest for her to have visitation. 79 The court
also relied on Mullins v. Picklesimer,8° a Kentucky case also involving a
same-sex custody dispute, and rejected the idea that its holding would open
the floodgates to allowing anyone to seek custody of a child."'
The Nebraska Supreme Court relied on Bethany when it handed down
its decision in Latham v. Schwerdtfeger.8 2 That case also involved a custody
dispute between same-sex partners. The child in Latham was born through
in vitro fertilization. The non-birth mother sought custody of the child after
visitation stopped. The trial court granted the birth mother visitation after
finding that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply. Relying on Beth-
any, and as a number other cases across the country, the Nebraska court held
that the doctrine did apply and reversed the lower court's finding that the
non-birth mother lacked standing to pursue custody and visitation."'
178. Id. at 10-11, __ S.W.3d at _ (citation omitted). The court's reasoning is similar
to that espoused by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
Simply put, the nature of the relationship between Appellant and Appellee has no legal sig-
nificance to the determination of whether Appellee stands in loco parentis to A.M. The ability
to marry the biological parent and the ability to adopt the subject child have never been and
are not now factors in determining whether the third party assumed a parental status and
discharged parental duties. What is relevant, however, is the method by which the third party
gained authority to do so. The record is clear that Appellant consented to Appellee's per-
formance of parental duties. She encouraged Appellee to assume the status of a parent and
acquiesced as Appellee carried out the day-to-day care of A.M. Thus, this is not a case where
the third party assumed the parental status against the wishes of the biological parent. The
Superior Court aptly noted, under similar circumstances, that a biological parent's rights "do
not extend to erasing a relationship between her partner and her child which she voluntarily
created and actively fostered simply because after the parties' separation she regretted having
done so.
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913,918-19 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 11-13, _ S.W.3d at 7.
180. 317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010).
181. Bethany, 2011 Ark. 67, at 13-14, _ S.W.3d
182. 802 N.W.2d 66 (Neb. 2011).
183. Id. at 73-75.
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In addition, the Arkansas Court of Appeals cited both Robinson and
Bethany in Fox v. Glassing."84 That case involved a nonmarried, opposite-
sex couple. Fox and Glassing lived together in 2003 and eventually had a
child, J.F.'85 Glassing's young son, S.G., also lived in the household.'86
When the couple separated, a custody battle ensued over J.F.' 87 Fox also
sought visitation rights with S.G. 88 The circuit court awarded Glassing cus-
tody of J.F. and denied Fox visitation with S.G.'89 The court of appeals re-
versed the denial of the visitation order. 9° Relying on Bethany, the court
noted that a person may qualify as an "in loco parentis parent" even when
not married to the biological parent.' 9'
On its face, Bethany may give homosexual couples some confidence
that Arkansas courts may respect their "agreed-upon" parental rights if the
relationship fails; however, this may not be the case. Jones was successful
because she had an actual relationship with and stood in loco parentis to the
child. Had she not stood in loco parentis for one reason or another (maybe
because Jones worked outside the home while Bethany was the primary
caretaker), the case may have been different. The circuit court explicitly
rejected traditional custody statutes as a basis for the on-birth parent's stand-
ing to seek custody or visitation. 192 And in Walchli v. Morris,193 decided less
than a month after Bethany, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected a
grandmother's request for visitation under the doctrine of in loco parentis,
finding that the grandmother's relationship with the child did not rise to the
level of co-parent. There is no indication that the Arkansas appellate courts
will extend the decision in Bethany to a former same-sex partner who does
not stand in loco parentis to the child. Further, the circuit court refused to
consider awarding custody to Jones in light of the Troxel decision. The fact
that Arkansas law treats homosexuals and heterosexuals equally as it relates
to the doctrine of in loco parentis is great, but a "parent" that plays no role in
the care of the child may have no rights whatsoever.
184. 2011 Ark. App. 633, __ S.W.3d
185. Id. at 1, __ S.W.3d at.
186. Id., S.W.3d at __
187. Id. at2, __ S.W.3d at.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 2011 Ark. App. 633, 6, S.W.3d .
191. Id. at 5-6, - S.W.3d at _. Both Robinson and Bethany were discussed in Daniel
v. Spivey, 2012 Ark. 39, - S.W.3d - (reversing a stepparent visitation order after hold-
ing that the stepparent did not stand in loco parentis to the child).
192. See Appellant's Brief, Bethany, at Add. 14-15 (Order entered June 26, 2009, pp. 2-
3). The court ruled that ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (outlining custody decision in a divorce)
was inapplicable because the parties were not married, and it stated that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-
10-113 (the paternity statute) did not apply because this case was not a paternity action.
193. 2011 Ark. App. 170, _ S.W.3d
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WV. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES. V. COLE'94
While Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Cole was decided in
April 2011, its story began before the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Picado. There had been multiple efforts to ban homosexuals from
fostering or adopting children in Arkansas, but the Supreme Court ulti-
mately decided that such a ban violated privacy protections under the Ar-
kansas Constitution.
The Child Welfare Agency Review Board, established by the Child
Welfare Agency Licensing Act, 195 has the duty of "setting minimum stan-
dards governing the granting, revocation, refusal, conversion, and suspen-
sion of licenses for a child welfare agency and the operation of a child wel-
fare agency."' 96 The Board is specifically authorized to establish rules that
"[p]romote the health, safety, and welfare of children in the care of a child
welfare agency."' 97 Relying upon that authority, the Board promulgated
Regulation 200.3.2 of the Minimum Licensing Standards for Child Welfare
Agencies:
No person may serve as a foster parent if any adult member of that per-
son's household is a homosexual. Homosexual, for purposes of this rule,
shall mean any person who voluntarily and knowingly engages in or
submits to any sexual contact involving the genitals of one person and
the mouth or anus of another person of the same gender, and who has
engaged in such activity after the foster home is approved or at a point in
time that is reasonably close in time to the filing of the application to be
a foster parent. 98
In April 1999, the constitutionality of the regulation was challenged. 19
The plaintiffs in the case alleged violations of the rights to equal protection,
privacy, and intimate association. The circuit court rejected these arguments,
but it found that the regulation did not promote the health, safety, or welfare
of children. 200 Thus, the provision violated the separation-of-powers doctrine
under the Arkansas Constitution.2°' The court's decision was based upon a
number of findings. The parties stipulated to a number of facts:
194. 2011 Ark. 145, S.W.3d .
195. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-401 to -409 (LEXIS Repl. 2009).
196. Id. § 9-28-405(a)(1).
197. Id. § 9-28-405(c)(1)(A).
198. As quoted in Dep't of Human Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. How-






4. When the Child Welfare Agency regulations were first promul-
gated in 1997 there was no provision excluding lesbians, gay men, or
persons living with such individuals because the Child Welfare Agency
saw no need for such exclusion.
6. The Board's attorney advised the Board that there was no need to
enact the exclusionary provision because the preexisting regulations al-
ready gave the Board the enforcement power to take care of any con-
cerns and to adequately protect the interests of children.
9. Prior to 1999, there was no prohibition under any Arkansas law
or regulation excluding lesbians or gay men or those living with them
from being foster parents.
10. The defendants are aware of "homosexuals," as defined, who
have served as foster parents in Arkansas.
11. The defendants are not aware of any child whose health, safety,
and/or welfare has been endangered by the fact that such child's foster
parent, or other household member, was "homosexual", [sic] as defined.
12. The State has no statistics indicating that gays are more prone
to violence than heterosexuals or that gay households are more unhealthy
than heterosexual households.
13. Based on its foster care statistics the defendants do not know of
any reason that lesbians and gay men would be unsuitable to be foster
parents.2 °2
The circuit court made these additional findings:
23. The blanket exclusion may be harmful to promoting children's
healthy adjustment because it excludes a pool of effective foster parents.
29. Being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk of
problems in adjustment for children.
30. Being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk of
psychological problems for children.
31. Being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk of be-
havioral problems.
202. Id. at 62-63, 238 S.W.3d at 6-7 (citations to record omitted).
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32. Being raised by gay parents does not prevent children from
forming healthy relationships with their peers or others.
33. Being raised by gay parents does not cause academic problems.
34. Being raised by gay parents does not cause gender identity
problems.
37. Children of lesbian or gay parents are equivalently adjusted to
children of heterosexual parents.
38. There is no factual basis for making the statement that hetero-
sexual parents might be better able to guide their children through
adolescence than gay parents.
39. There is no factual basis for making the statement that the
sexual orientation of a parent or foster parent can predict children's
adjustment.
40. There is no factual basis for making the statement that being
raised by lesbian or gay parents has a negative effect on children's [sic]
adjustment.
41. There is no reason in which the health, safety, or welfare of a
foster child might be negatively impacted by being placed with a hetero-
sexual foster parent who has an adult gay family member residing in that
home.
46. There is no evidence that gay people, as a group, are more
likely to engage in domestic violence than heterosexuals.
47. There is no evidence that gay people, as a group, are more
likely to sexually abuse children than heterosexuals.
20 3
Both the Board and the plaintiffs challenged the circuit court's deci-
sion. The Board argued that the regulation did not violate the separation-of-
powers doctrine, while the plaintiffs contended that the regulation violated
their rights to equal protection and privacy. In Department of Human Ser-
vices and Child Welfare Agency Review Board v. Howard, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the Board acted outside the scope of its authority. It
found "no correlation between the health, welfare, and safety of foster chil-
dren and the blanket exclusion of any individual who is a homosexual or
203. Id. at 63-65, 238 S.W.3d at 7.
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who resides in a household with a homosexual."2 °4 It stated that the regula-
tion was not a product of the Board's desire to promote the health, safety,
and welfare of children, but rather a produce of its views of morality and
anti-homosexual bias."' Thus, the Board acted outside the scope of its au-
thority, and its actions were unconstitutional.0 6
Because it held that the regulation violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine, the Supreme Court declined to address the plaintiff's constitutional
arguments. 2 7 But Justice Robert Brown, who would later write the majority
opinion in Cole, authored a concurring opinion addressing the plaintiffs
equal-protection and privacy arguments:
Regulation 200.3(2) overtly and significantly burdens the privacy rights
of couples engaged in sexual conduct in the bedroom which this court
has specifically declared to be impermissible as violative of equal-
protection and privacy rights. The State argues that prohibiting foster-
parent status due to sexual activity in the bedroom is categorically differ-
ent from making the conduct a misdemeanor which was the issue in Je-
gley. But is it? In both instances, gay and lesbian couples are saddled
with an infirmity due to sexual orientation. To be sure, in the first in-
stance, a crime is the burden. But in the second, gay couples are denied
the freedom to act as foster parents for dependent and neglected children.
And who are the ultimate losers in this? It is the foster children who will
be forced to reside in youth homes because an insufficient pool of will-
ing foster parents is available.
The trial court's findings of facts as well as the stipulation by the parties
undermine any basis for the attack on bedroom privacy occasioned by
Regulation 200.3(2). Indeed, the trial court found that being raised by
gay and lesbian parents does not increase adjustment problems for chil-
dren. There is no rational basis in the form of studies or empirical data
that sustains the regulation. And the United States Supreme Court as
well as this court have made it clear that mere moral disapproval of sex-
ual activity by a group does not qualify as a legitimate reason for an at-
tack on equal protection or privacy rights. All that DHS has left propping
up Regulation 200.3(2) is a moral preference by the Child Welfare
Agency Review Board without anything to suggest that foster children
will be jeopardized as a result.
2 0 8
204. Howard, 367 Ark. at 65, 238 S.W.3d at 7.
205. Id. at 65, 238 S.W.3d at 8.
206. Id. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8.
207. Id. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8-9.
208. Id. at 68-69, 238 S.W.3d at 10-11 (Brown, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Soon after the Supreme Court handed down Howard, an effort began to
reestablish the Board's restriction on homosexuals adopting and fostering
children. Candidates for Governor and leaders in the Arkansas General As-
sembly publicly decried Howard and promised to legislatively reinstate the
ban.2 9 In 2007, a senator filed a bill entitled, "An Act To Protect the Chil-
dren Who Are Most Vulnerable by Clarifying the Public Policy of the State
of Arkansas Regarding the Placement of Children with an Adoptive or Fos-
ter Parent [and] to Authorize the Department of Health and Human Services
to Promulgate Rules and Regulations. '20 The bill passed in the Senate, but
it did not make it out of the House Judiciary Committee. 21' The following
year, the Arkansas Family Council Action Committee ("Family Council")
gathered enough signatures to put the matter before voters'.2 2 Commonly
referred to as "Initiated Act 1," Arkansas voters considered "An Act Provid-
ing That an Individual Who is Cohabiting Outside of a Valid Marriage May
Not Adopt or Be a Foster Parent of a Child Less Than Eighteen Years Old."
Initiated Act 1 was approved by 57% of the voters.13 The Act established a
declaration that "it is in the best interest of children in need of adoption or
foster care to be reared in homes in which adoptive or foster parents are not
cohabiting outside of marriage. 2 4 It also established a public policy of fa-
voring marriage over unmarried cohabitation with respect to adoption and
foster care.215 To that end, the Act provided:
(a) A minor may not be adopted or placed in a foster home if the
individual seeking to adopt or to serve as a foster parent is cohabiting
with a sexual partner outside of a marriage which is valid under the con-
stitution and laws of this state.
(b) The prohibition of this section applies equally to cohabiting op-
216posite-sex and same-sex individuals.
The language of the Act was broad enough to make it appear that its
drafters were not targeting homosexuals. The best argument supporting this
view was that the Act focused more on the relationship between the pro-
spective adopting parents and not their sexual orientation or behavior.217
209. Alexander Justiss, Note, Is the Arkansas Supreme Court Abandoning Judicial Fed-
eralism?, 30 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 105, 133 (2007).
210. Id. at 134.
211. Id. at 135-36.
212. Lynn D. Wardle, Comparative Perspectives on Adoption of Children by Cohabiting,
Nonmarital Couples and Partners, 63 ARK. L. REV. 31, 40 (2010).
213. Id.
214. Initiated Act 1 § 5, 2009 Ark. Acts. 14, 14-16 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-
301 to 306 (Repl. 2009)).
215. Id. at § 4.
216. Id. at § 1.
217. See Wardle, supra note 212, at 44-45.
20121
UALR LAW REVIEW
Even so, there was no question regarding Act l's intended effect. It was in
direct response to the Howard decision. Four years prior, Arkansans ap-
proved a constitutional amendment barring homosexuals from marrying."' 8
By including the language limiting potential adopting couples to those val-
idly married "under the constitution and laws of this state," the Act inten-
tionally excluded those who may have validly been married under the laws
of another state. 219 Because homosexuals cannot marry in Arkansas, they
could not, by extension, adopt or foster children. Finally, despite the public
policy favoring married individuals, the Act did not bar single people from
adopting or fostering children, and it did not apply to guardianships. One
commentator explained:
Some supporters of the Initiative suggested that its adoption would en-
sure that the State uses the "gold standard" when deciding which homes
were suitable for placements. But there are at least two difficulties with
this rationale. First, it is by no means clear that married couples are the
gold standard for adoptive placements, because other factors seem to
play a more important role When determining whether in fact a child will
thrive and thus who should be deemed the "gold" would-be adoptive
parents. Even were it true that marital couples were the equivalent of the
gold standard, the initiative did not limit adoptions to this allegedly op-
timal scenario, because it did nothing to preclude singles from adopting.
However, absent persuasive reasons to think that single persons provide
better adoptive homes for children than nonmarital couples, permitting
the former but not the latter to adopt undermines the contention that the
Initiative was about finding the best place for children and instead sug-
gests that other reasons motivated the adoption of the Act. Further, even
if it were established that singles were better than nonmarital couples for
children, it still would be necessary to provide justification for excluding
qualified applicants from the pool. Thus, there are a whole host of rea-
sons to believe that adoption of the Initiative was not motivated by a de-




Less than two months after Arkansas voters approved Act 1, a suit was
filed in Pulaski County Circuit Court challenging its constitutionality on
both federal and state grounds. 22' The plaintiffs included unmarried adults
218. See ARK. CONST. amend 83 (approved by the voters in 2004).
219. Initiated Act 1 § 5.
220. Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Arkansas Constitution, 63 ARK. L.
REv. 3, 27 (2010). Of particular note is a flyer, which was attached to the complaint in Cole
and distributed by the Family Council Action Committee. Among the benefits of Act 1, ac-
cording to the flyer, was that it "Blunts the Gay Agenda." Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. Ad-
dendum, Cole, at Add. 40.
221. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 2-3, _ S.W.3d at__
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who wished to foster or adopt children, adult parents who wished to direct
the adoption of their biological children in the event of their incapacitation
or death, and the biological children of those parents.222 The Family Council
intervened in the lawsuit and, along with the State, defended the constitu-
tionality of the act.223 By order entered April 16, 2010, the circuit court ad-
dressed the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.224 It found that,
under federal law, Initiated Act 1 involved no fundamental right and no sus-
pect class. 225 Thus, the law needed only be rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose to pass constitutional muster on the federal level.
Therefore, the court accepted the State's argument "that cohabiting envi-
ronments, on average, facilitate poorer child performance outcomes and
expose children to higher risks of abuse than do home environments where
the parents are married or single.
2 26
The law did not fare as well when analyzed under state grounds. The
circuit court recognized the right to engage in private, consensual, noncom-
mercial acts of sexual intimacy announced in Picado, and it found that Act 1
infringed upon that right.22 ' Accordingly, the law had to be the least restric-
tive method available to carry out a compelling state interest.2 28 The court
found that Act I failed to meet that heightened scrutiny. 229 Thus, the circuit
court struck down Act 1 as against the Arkansas Constitution. The next stop
for this case was the Arkansas Supreme Court.
As was the case in Picado, federal precedent did not favor the Cole
plaintiffs. Since 1977, Florida has barred anyone engaging in "current, vol-
untary homosexual activity" from adopting children. 230 There had been sev-
eral attempts to legislatively repeal the statute, but none were successful.
23'
In Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services,232 the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of
the statute. 3 The plaintiffs presented three arguments: (1) that the statute
violated the rights to familial privacy, intimate association, and family integ-
rity; (2) that the statute impermissibly burdened the right to private sexual
222. Id. at 2-3.
223. Id. at 5, S.W.3d at__
224. Id. at 5, S.W.3d at__
225. Id. at 6, S.W.3d at .
226. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. Addendum, Cole, at Add. 1007 (Pulaski County Circuit
Ct. Order in No. 60CV-08-14284, entered April 16, 2010).
227. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 at 19.
228. Id. at 20.
229. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. Addendum, Cole, at Add. 1008.
230. Lofton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806-07 (1 1th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1081 (2005) (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3)).
231. Id. at 807.
232. Id. at 804.
233. Id. at 807.
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intimacy; and (3) that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by
categorically barring only homosexuals from adopting children.2 34 The dis-
trict court rejected the arguments and granted the government's motion for
summary judgment.235
The court of appeals affirmed the district court and rejected the plain-
tiff's arguments.236 First, it recognized that there was no fundamental fight to
adopt or be adopted.237 While conceding that there may be procedural due
process rights to groups that have formed familial bonds,238 it declined to
extend substantive rights to family integrity "for groups of individuals who
have formed deeply loving and interdependent relationships. '239 Second, it
refused to extend Lawrence to include a fundamental right to private sexual
intimacy.2 ° Because there was no fundamental right involved, according to
the court, there was no need to determine whether Florida's prohibition
against homosexuals adopting children infringed upon any such right.24'
Finally, it held that there was a rational basis for the law.242 Specifically, the
law, according to the court, encouraged a stable and nurturing environment
for the socialization and education of children and promoted the optimal
family structure of a married mother and father.243
The Eleventh Circuit specifically considered several of the plaintiffs
arguments. First, it rejected the idea that homosexuals were no different than
single heterosexuals, who made up twenty-five percent of adoptive par-
ents.244 The court held that it was not irrational to believe that a single het-
erosexual person could be in a better position to create a stable, dual-
parenting environment than a homosexual parent.24 Second, it was not per-
suaded by the fact that the ban resulted in an overpopulated foster care sys-
tem.246 The court identified the state's interest, not in placing foster children
in a home as quickly as possible, but in placing them in an optimal home.247
Third, the plaintiffs noted that homosexuals in Florida are allowed to be-
come foster parents and permanent guardians, but the court did not believe
234. Id. at 809.
235. Id. at 808-09.
236. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 810.
237. Id. at 811-12.
238. Id. 358 F.3d at 812-15.
239. Id. at 815.
240. Id. at 815-17.
241. Id. at 817.
242. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818 (ultimately concluding that there was no fundamental right
or suspect class involved).
243. Id. at 819-20.
244. Id. at 820.
245. Id. at 822.
246. Id. at 823.
247. Id.
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this defeated the rational basis for the adoption law. Instead, it deferred to
the legislative branch's decision to distinguish adoption from foster parent-
age and guardianship.248 Fourth, it explicitly rejected any social science re-
search, which tended to show that there is no basis for rejecting homosexual
adoption. 249 The court reasoned that the research was still novel and inclu-
sive, and it again rejected the legislature's decision to side against homosex-
ual adoptive parents.' Finally, it distinguished the instant case from Romer
v. Evans,25' where the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a
state constitutional amendment that prohibited any government action de-
signed to protect homosexuals from discrimination. 2 The Eleventh Circuit
found the Florida law to be narrow and outside the scope of Romer.
253
Not only was the federal precedent against the Cole plaintiffs, but also
was precedent in other states. In a law review article on Initiated Act 1, Pro-
fessor Lynn Wardle wrote that nine other jurisdictions (Alabama, Florida,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin)
clearly did not allow same-sex couples and partners to adopt or foster chil-
dren. 5 4 Twenty-three states (Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming) had
no legislation or appellate court decision on the issue, but he described these
jurisdictions as also not allowing same-sex couples to adopt.
2 55
Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court would not have been break-
ing new ground by allowing same-sex couples to adopt. Professor Wardle
acknowledged that seventeen states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wash-
ington) plus the District of Columbia either allowed or "probably allowed"
same-sex couples to adopt.256 Several of those states have some type of
statutory provision that allows same-sex couples to adopt children. 5 7 In
248. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 823-24.
249. Id. at 825-26.
250. Id.
251. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
252. Id. at 621.
253. Lofton, 358 F.3d 826-27.
254. Wardle, supra note 212, at 98.
255. Id. at 47, 98.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 48 n.71 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2010) ("A domestic partner,
as defined in Section 297, desiring to adopt a child of his or her domestic partner may for that
purpose file a petition in the county in which the petitioner resides."); COL. REV. STAT. ANN.
§19-5-203(d.5)(I) (West 2010) ("Written and verified consent in a second-parent adoption
that the child has a sole legal parent, and the sole legal parent wishes the child to be adopted
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other states, the judiciary has held that the law does not prohibit homosexu-
als from adopting or fostering children.258 None of the cases cited by Profes-
sor Wardle focused the constitutional dimensions of a ban.
Further, the laws restricting same-sex couples from adopting children
have been coming under fire in state courts. For example, the Florida ban
addressed in Lofton is now in question, as a Florida state court has declared
it unconstitutional on state grounds.259 In In re Adoption of Doe, the court
considered a petition to adopt, filed by a gay man.2" He argued that the
Florida law banning him from adopting two children violated that state's
constitution.26" ' The Florida court recognized that the law had survived other
challenges in state court.262 For example, in Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, 263 the Florida district court rejected the
arguments that the statute violated the rights of privacy, substantive due
process, or equal protection.26 With no fundamental right or suspect class
involved, the court applied the rational-basis test to the law, and the court
by a specified second adult."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 2010) ("[A] child-
placing agency may consider the sexual orientation of the prospective adoptive or foster
parent or parents when placing a child for adoption or in foster care."); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210, § 1 (West 2010) ("A person of full age may petition the probate court in the
county where he resides for leave to adopt as his child another person younger than himself
.... ); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (West 2010) ("Any of the following individuals may
adopt ... [a]n unmarried adult ... [tlhe unmarried parent of the adoptee."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15A, § 1-102(b) (West 2010) ("If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner,
and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent may adopt a child of
the parent. Termination of the parent's parental rights is unnecessary in an adoption under this
subsection.")).
258. Id. (citing In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995) (allowing sec-
ond-parent adoption in stages by a couple); In re Petition of K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888,
899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (allowing lesbian partner adoption); Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620,
628 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (granting petition of biological mother's domestic partner to adopt
biological mother's children); In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Me. 2007)
(allowing joint petition for adoption by a gay couple after interpreting adoption law to allow
adoption by two unmarried persons); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d
535, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding that children could be adopted by their
mother's partner without terminating their mother's parental fights); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d
397, 400 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that lesbian and unmarried heterosexual partners had standing
under New York law to become adoptive parents); In re Adoption of R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803
A.2d 1195, 1196-97 (Pa. 2002) (finding an exception provision in state adoption law gives
court discretion to grant partner's adoption that otherwise is not allowed by statute)).
259. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 11th Jud. Cir., Nov. 25,
2008) (unpublished).
260. Id. at 1.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 4.
263. 627 So.2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
264. Id. at 1215-19.
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accepted that it would be best if they were raised by heterosexuals, as most
children available for adoption will be heterosexual.265
Returning to Doe, the court cited the Florida law, which required the
State to provide dependent children with a permanent, stable home, and it
recognized that the petitioners could provide the children in question with
that permanency and stability.266 It also recognized that children had a lib-
erty interest in being free from State care.267 It borrowed heavily from a
California Supreme Court decision, In re Jasmon 0. which provided the
following:
2 68
The California Supreme Court also recognized that foster children have
fundamental interests of their own that are subject to constitutional pro-
tection. "Children, too, have fundamental rights-including the fundamen-
tal right to be protected from neglect and to 'have a placement that is sta-
ble [and] permanent."' "Children are not simply chattels belonging to the
parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge
from the interests of the parent." "[A]fter a child has spent a substantial
period in foster care and attempts at reunification have proved fruitless,
the child's interest in stability outweighs the parent's interest in asserting
the right to the custody and companionship of the child." Each of these
statements from the California Supreme Court rings true, unsurprisingly
so because each of these rights are familiar to Florida's statutory and
constitutional framework for the protection of foster children's rights.
The declared foster child's right to an adoptive home when the child is
available for adoption is a fundamental right.
269
The Florida circuit court found that the ban on same-sex adoptive par-
enting "violates the Children's rights by burdening liberty interests by un-
duly restraining them in State custody on one hand and simultaneously op-
erating to deny them a permanent adoptive placement that is in their best
interests on the other. '270 The court then considered the equal-protection
challenge. It recognized that the law had previously survived challenges,
including the federal challenge in Lofton, but the court held that the question
was ripe for reconsideration given the developments in social-science fields
265. Id. at 1219-21. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the district court's opinion,
holding that the trial court's record was insufficient to determine whether the statute could
survive the rational-basis standard for equal protection, but it did so without discussing the
substance of the district court's opinion. Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.,
656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam).
266. Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at 21-23.
267. Id. at 24.
268. 8 Cal. 4th 398, 878 P.2d 1297 (1994).
269. Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at 24 (quoting Jasmon 0., 8 Cal. 4th at 419, 878 P.2d at
1307) (internal citations omitted).
270. Id. at 25.
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and the endorsements by major psychological, psychiatric, child-welfare,
and social-work groups.2 ' Applying the rational-basis test, it considered
three interests proposed by the State: (1) promotion of the welfare of chil-
dren by placing them in homes that experience higher levels of stressors that
are disadvantageous to children, (2) placing adoptive children in homes that
minimize social stigmatization, and (3) protection of the societal moral in-
terests of the child.272
First, the Florida court rejected the idea that the ban on homosexuals
adopting children protected children from "the undesirable realities of the
homosexual lifestyle. 273 It relied on evidence showing that gays and lesbi-
ans were no more susceptible to mental health or psychological disorders,
substance abuse, or relationship instability than their heterosexual counter-
parts.274 Second, it found that social stigmatization was not a rational basis
for the law, holding that "there is a well established and accepted consensus
in the field that there is no optimal gender combination of parents. 275 Fi-
nally, it stated that the protection of public morality was not a rational basis
for the ban. 76 It noted that Florida law allows homosexuals to foster chil-
dren, and it stated that "there is no 'morality' interest with regard to one
group of individuals permitted to form the visage of a family in one context
but prohibited in another.
27
1
Of course, Doe is not even binding in most of Florida, as it was a trial
court decision. There is no indication that the case would survive appellate
scrutiny. Nonetheless, Doe is an example of how gays and lesbians have
been using state constitutions to gain rights, even in states where their rela-
tionships are given no legal recognition. 78
In Cole, both the State and the Family Council filed briefs in support of
the voter-initiated law banning cohabiting, unmarried couples from fostering
or adopting children. In their briefs, the State and the Family Council chal-
lenged the circuit court's decision that the act significantly burdens the fun-
damental right to private acts of sexual intimacy. While they conceded that
Picado invalidated criminal prohibitions against private sexual conduct, they
contended that the case did not entail a fight to cohabitation. 279 The State
271. Id. at 27.
272. Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at 27.




277. Id. at 29.
278. On the same day that Arkansas voters adopted a constitutional amendment banning
recognition of same-sex marriages, Florida voters also amended their constitution to limit the
definition of marriage to the legal union of a man and a woman. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
279. Family Council Action Committee Brief at Arg. 3, 7-9, Cole, 2011 Ark 145 (No.
10-840) [hereinafter Family Council Action Committee Brief]; Arkansas Department of
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noted that there are a number of things that would disqualify someone from
adopting in Arkansas, including a failure to meet the residency requirement
and not meeting any religious requirements requested by the biological par-
ents.280 The Family Council further claimed that giving marital privileges to
cohabitating partners would run afoul of the state constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriages.28' It stated that the purpose of the state child-
welfare system is to protect children and that the State does not intrude upon
the lives of adults until they seek to adopt or foster a child.282 Relying on
Lofton, it concluded that the point of the adoption statutes is to provide a
child with a secure environment, not provide an opportunity for an adult to
become a parent.283 The Family Council also noted the Arkansas judiciary's
condemnation of cohabitation in the presence of children in the context of
traditional child-custody cases.284 Based upon its conclusion that Act 1 did
not infringe upon a fundamental right, the Family Council urged the Su-
preme Court to apply the rational-basis test in determining the constitution-
ality of the act, and it asserted that placing children in homes with married
couples, which studies showed to be more stable on average, was a rational
basis for the act.
28
On the other hand, the Cole plaintiffs argued that Act 1 did impinge
upon Arkansas's constitutional right to privacy. They contended that the
State could not comply with Act 1 without monitoring the activity of unmar-
ried adults.286 The argument was that if a foster parent began cohabiting with
a sexual partner, the relationship would run afoul of the ban, and DHS
would have to immediately remove the child from the home, regardless of
the child's best interests.287 Because the law infringed upon constitutional
interests, according to the plaintiffs, the law could survive only if it was the
least restrictive method available to promote a compelling state interest.
288
And they believed that the law was not narrowly tailored to meet any such
interest.
The Cole plaintiffs further argued that there was no rational basis for
Act 1. First, the law reduced the number of available foster and adoptive
Human Services Appellant's Brief at Arg. 12-18, Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 (No. 10-840) [herein-
after State's Brief, Cole].
280. State's Brief, Cole, supra note 279, at Arg. 9-11.
281. Family Council Action Committee Brief, supra note 279, at Arg. 4, 11-13.
282. Id. at Arg. 5-6.
283. Id. at Arg. 6-7 (citing Lofton, 358 F.3d at 811).
284. Id. at Arg. 9-11 (citing Alphin v. Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 341, 219 S.W.3d 160, 165-
66 (2005)).
285. Id. at Arg. 17.
286. Appellees/Cross-Appellant's Supplemental Abstract, Brief and Supplemental Ad-
dendum at Arg. 7, Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 (No. 10-840) [hereinafter Sheila Cole's Brief, Cole].
287. Id.
288. Id. at Arg. 8.
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homes, thus operating against what is in the best interests of children wait-
ing for a home.28 9 They believed that the individualized process in place was
sufficient to protect the interests of children.2 9° Second, they adopted the
reasoning of the Florida Circuit Court in Doe: that there was no basis for
allowing cohabiting persons to be guardians but not foster or adoptive par-
ents. 291 Third, they asserted that the State's and the Family Council's reli-
ance on "average" outcomes was irrelevant, as those studies did not focus on
particular individuals, particularly those who would otherwise be qualified
to adopt children but for the prohibition in Act 1 292 Fourth, they relied on
evidence suggesting that children raised by same-sex couples faired no
worse than those raised by opposite-sex couples.293 Finally, the plaintiffs
289. Id. at Arg. 21-22.
290. Id. at Arg. 22-23.
291. Id., at Arg. 23. They specifically noted that guardianships require far less court over-
sight than foster relationships and adoptions. Id.
292. Sheila Cole's Brief, Cole, at Arg. 24-27.
293. Id. at 27-28. Indeed, the psychological and sociological amici in Picado also saw no
differences between homosexual and heterosexual parents:
Many gay men and lesbians are also parents. The consistent conclusion drawn
from two decades of scientific research conducted on gay and lesbian parents and
their children is that these children demonstrate no deficits in intellectual devel-
opment, social adjustment or psychological well-being from children raised by
heterosexual parents. (citations omitted).
A recent article surveying the scientific studies on this issue reported no differ-
ences between children raised by lesbians and those raised by heterosexuals with
respect to self-esteem, anxiety, depression, behavioral problems, performance in
sports, school and friendships, use of counseling, unsociability, hyperactivity, or
emotional difficulty. (citations omitted) To the extent that the authors of that arti-
cle reported results from prior studies suggesting that there might be some differ-
ences between children raised by homosexual and those raised by heterosexual
parents, the data suggesting the differences were generally not statistically sig-
nificant and were often contradicted by other studies. (citations omitted) The au-
thors also reported that "in studies of matched lesbian and heterosexual couples,
women in every category-heterosexual birth mother, lesbian birth mother, non-
biological lesbian social mother-all score about the same as one another, but all
score significantly higher than the men on measures having to do with the care of
children." (citations omitted) Finally, the authors reported data suggesting that
non-biological lesbian mothers have stronger parenting skills than both biologi-
cal and non-biological heterosexual fathers, but observed that such differences
"may have more to do with gender than with sexual orientation." (citations
omitted)
Psychological/Sociological Associations Amici, Picado II, at 13-14 (citing Green & Bozett,
Lesbian Mothers and Gay Fathers, in Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public
Policy 197, 213 (J. Gonsiorek & J. Weinrich eds., 1991); C. Patterson, Children of Lesbian
and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992); D. Flaks et al., Lesbians Choosing Mother-
hood: A Comparative Study of Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents and Their Children, 31
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 105 (1995); R. Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by
Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978); M. Kirkpatrick et
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found it irrational for supporters of the law to believe that children do best
with both a mother and a father, yet support a law that still allows noncohab-
iting singles to adopt, even if they are frequently engaged in sexual activi-
ties.294
Conversely, while it did not address whether Act 1 could survive
heightened scrutiny in its main brief, the Family Council believed that the
act was narrowly tailored to protect children. It accused the plaintiffs of not
appreciating "the high value of the interest at stake ... or the consequences
of process failure, such as neglect, abuse, and even death." '295 Family Coun-
cil explained that "by cutting out the riskiest, poorest-performing environ-
ments, [Act 1] directly and narrowly protects children from negative and
potentially dangerous outcomes."
296
The court had before it an amicus brief supported by a number of
groups representing various adoption and psychological organizations. 97
They believed that the Act's blanket ban was harmful to the best interests of
children, and they urged an individualized assessment of each adoption.29 s
They advocated adoption over long-term foster care. 299 Given the number of
children awaiting a foster home or adoption (they cited a study showing 518
children in Arkansas awaiting adoption but only 228 available homes, as
well as 3856 children awaiting foster care but only 1077 available homes), 300
they viewed that children faced the choice not "of adoption by a married or
unmarried cohabiting couple, but rather the much more stark choice of
al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
545 (1981); J. Stacey & T. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?,
66 AM. Soc. REV. 159, 169, 171 (2001)).
294. Cole's Brief at Arg. 28-29, Cole.
295. Family Council Reply Brief, Cole, at Arg. 14.
296. Id. at Arg. 14-15.
297. Brief of Amicus Curiae Dr. Roger Hiatt, et al., Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 (No. 10-840)
[hereinafter"Amicus Brief in Support of Appellees, Cole"] (including American Academy of
Adoption Attorneys; Arkansas Advocates for Children & Families; Arkansas Chapter of
American Academy of Pediatrics; Arkansas Psychological Ass'n; Arkansas Chapter of the
Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers; Center for Adoption Policy; Child Welfare League of Amer-
ica; Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute; Foster Care Alumni of America; Barbara Miles
(former Arkansas foster youth); Nat'l Center for Adoption Law & Policy; Nat'l Center for
Youth Law; North American Council on Adoptable Children; Marcia A. Shobe, Ph.D., Univ.
of Arkansas of Fayetteville, School of Social Work; and Howard M. Turney Ph.D., Univ. of
Arkansas at Little Rock, School of Social Work). There were also two other amicus briefs
filed in support of the Cole plaintiffs. One was filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund. The other was filed on behalf of a number of Arkansas law school professors.
298. Id. at 1.
299. Id. at 2-4.
300. Id. at 4 (citing Arkansas Department of Human Services Division of Children and
Family Services SFY 2009 Annual Report Card (the "Report Card") (available at




adoption by whatever couple or individual is available or no adoption at
all." 30' They noted that lawmakers were moving away from categorical
adoption bans and toward "a more inclusive approach that does not rule out
an applicant unless an individualized evaluation suggests that he or she
would not be an appropriate parent. '3 2 These amici also cited studies that
found no scientific basis for categorically banning gays and lesbians from
adopting or fostering children. Specifically, they wrote that gay and lesbian
parents fare as well as heterosexual parents when it comes to parenting skill,
and that there was no adverse relationship between parents' sexual orienta-
tion and cognitive skills and development.3 3 Further, according to these
amici, children raised by homosexual parents did not experience higher rates
of emotional or behavioral problems, were not more likely to become gay or
lesbian themselves, and fared just as well on assessments of peer relation-
ship quality and popularity compared to children raised by heterosexual
parents. 304 The criticism of this research, as those who supported the act
would identify, is that it compares homosexuals to heterosexuals, not mar-
ried couples to nonmarried, cohabiting couples. But the amici in support of
the appellees also believed that there was no basis for categorically banning
unmarried heterosexual couples from fostering or adopting children. They
noted that children raised by single people (who were, again, not excluded
from fostering or adopting), had outcomes comparable to (or in some cases,
worse than) unmarried heterosexual couples.305 Thus, they contended that
Act 1 was contrary to the health, safety, and welfare of children in state cus-
tody.
There were professionals in support of the Act as well. For example,
the court considered an amicus brief from a group of physicians and mental
health professionals led by Dr. Roger Hiatt, a child and adolescent psychia-
trist with seventeen years of experience working with children in Arkan-
301. Id. at 5.
302. Amicus Brief in Support of Appellees, at 9, Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 (No. 10-840) (citing
Alice Bussiere, The Development of Adoption Law, 1 ADOPTION Q., 3, 8 (1998); Joan Heifetz
Hollinger, Proposed Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, in THE PRAEGER HANDBOOK OF
ADOPTION, at 653-56 (Kath S. Stolley & Vern L. Bullough eds. 2006); see also Child Wel-
fare Information Gateway, The Adoption Home Study Process (2010), at 8, available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f-homstu.cfm ("many agencies are looking for ways to
rule families in rather than rule them out, in order to meet the needs of children in the U.S.
foster care system waiting for adoptive families").
303. Id. at 15-16.
304. Id. at 16-17.
305. Id. at 20-21 (citing Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-
Being in Cohabiting, Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 885
(2003); Cynthia Osborne & Sara McLanahan, Partnership Instability and Child Well-Being,
69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1065, 1072 (2007); Wendy D. Manning & Susan Brown, Children's
Economic Well-Being in Married and Cohabitating Parent Families, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
345, 359 (2006).
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sas.306 In their collective professional judgment, an adoptive child's best
interest would be better served by married parents or single parents, as op-
posed to unmarried, cohabiting couples. 307 They cited studies showing that
cohabiting adults are more likely to suffer from alcoholism, depression, and
aggression.3 8 And they relied on other studies linking cohabiting parents to
increased behavior problems, poorer academic scores, and increased illegal
drug use in children. 3" These professionals were also unwilling to accept
any studies supporting same-sex households, contending that such studies
were "nascent and not definitive enough to create the basis for dramatic
legal and social change in the preference for placing children in married,
dual-gender homes."31
The Arkansas Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the circuit court's
decision to strike down Act 1.31' The court's analysis started with Picado
and its applicably to the act.3"2 The court noted that Act 1 explicitly banned
those people "cohabiting with a sexual partner" (emphasis from the court)
outside of marriage from fostering or adopting children.3 3 Thus, for an un-
married person to foster or adopt children, he or she would have to give up
the right to cohabit with a sexual partner.3 14 Relying on the decision in Sher-
bert v. Verner,1 5 where the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a
denial of unemployment benefits based upon the claimant's refusal to work
on Saturdays for religious reasons,3 16 the court stated that Act 1 required
306. Brief of Amicus Curiae Dr. Roger Hiatt, et al., at 1-2, Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 (No. 10-
840) [hereinafter Hiatt Brief, Cole].
307. Id. at 3.
308. Id. at 4-5 (citing G.J. Duncan, B. Wilkerson & P. England, Cleaning Up Their Act:
The Impacts of Marriage and Cohabitation on Licit and Illicit Drug Use, 43 DEMOGRAPHY
691-710 (2003); A. V. Horwitz & H.R. White, The Relationship of Cohabitation and Mental
Health: A Study of a Young Adult Cohort, 60 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 505-14 (1998)).
309. Id. at 6 (citing Sandi Nelson, Rebecca L. Clark & Gregory Acs, Beyond the Two-
Parent Family: How Teenagers Fare in Cohabiting Couple and Blended Families, B-31 NEW
FEDERALISM NAT'L SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, URBAN INSTITUTE (2001); Shannon E.
Cavanaugh, Family Structure History and Adolescent Adjustment, 29 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES
944-80 (2008)).
310. Id. at 7-8, _ S.W.3d at .




315. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
316. In the words of the High Court:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition
of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion




citizens to forego a constitutional right in order to be eligible to foster or
adopt children. Moreover, according to the court, when a person who is liv-
ing apart from their sexual partner or lives with a partner but remains celi-
bate, the State becomes obligated as a result of Act 1 to either remove the
child from the home if the sexual partners decide to move in together or
intrude into the bedroom to ensure that the partners are indeed celibate.317
Thus, Act 1, according to the court, jeopardized the right to private, consen-
sual, noncommercial intimacy.318
But to hold that Act 1 violated this right of privacy seemed to run con-
trary to a rule often cited in the context of child-custody cases:
"[E]xtramarital cohabitation in the presence of children 'has never been
condoned in Arkansas, is contrary to the public policy of promoting a stable
environment for children, and may of itself constitute a material change in
circumstances warranting a change of custody.' 31 9 The Supreme Court was
not concerned with this issue, however, as the determination of what is in a
child's best interest in a child-custody case is made on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 320 The court stated that Act 1 acted as a blanket prohibition and failed to
consider the child's best interests on a case-by-case basis.32' In addition, it
noted that unlike the child-custody situation, any cohabiting partners are
known by entities approving the foster arrangement or adoption.32 Unsuit-
able parents are screened out of the process.323
The court stated that because Act 1 infringed upon a fundamental right,
it could only survive if it advanced a compelling state interest and was the
least restrictive method available to carry out that state interest.324 It deter-
mined that protecting children was unquestionably a compelling state inter-
est,325 so the issue became whether Act 1 was the least restrictive method of
protecting children. The Supreme Court held that it was not. It cited the
opinions of those who believed that the ban served no child welfare purpose:
Ed Appler, Child Welfare Agency Review Board (CWARB) member
and President of Grace Adoptions, said in his deposition taken August 4,
2009, that, as a Review Board Member and as a social worker, he could
not identify any child welfare interests that are advanced by Act 1. Sandi
Doherty, Division of Children and Family Services (DCFS) Program
317. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 17, _ S.W.3d.
318. Id.atl3-14,_ S.W.3dat .
319. Id. at 14, __ S.W.3d at - (quoting Alphin, 364 Ark. 332, 340, 219 S.W.3d 160,
165 (2005)).
320. Id. at 15__ S.W.3d at .
321. Id.
322. Id. at 15. S.W.3d at
323. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 16, - S.W.3d at.
324. Id. at 19, - S.W.3d at - (quoting Picado II, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350).
325. Id. at 20, - S.W.3d at . No one contested this point. Id.
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Administrator and former DCFS Area Director and County Supervisor,
in her deposition taken November 17, 2009, stated that in her personal
view Act 1 is not consistent with the best practices because it bars
placement of children with relatives who are cohabiting with a sexual
partner. Marilyn Counts, DCFS Administrator of Adoptions, in her
deposition taken December 9, 2009, agreed that she could not identify
any child welfare interests that are furthered by categorically excluding
unmarried couples from being assessed on an individual basis as to
whether they would be a suitable adoptive parent. John Selig, Director of
DHS, in his deposition taken December 16, 2009, stated that in his per-
sonal opinion, it is not in the best interest of children to have a categori-
cal ban on any cohabiting couple from fostering or adopting children be-
cause the case workers should have as much discretion as possible to
make the best placement. Moreover, counsel for the State and FCAC
admitted at oral argument that some adults cohabiting with their sexual
partners would be suitable and appropriate foster or adoptive parents, all
of which militates against a blanket ban.
326
In addition, the court stated that any concerns raised to justify the ban
were alleviated by the individualized screening process put in place for fos-
ter and adoption decisions.327 It was confident that the screening process
would eliminate unsuitable parents regardless of their sexual orientation.32 8
The process may not be perfect, but it was rigorous enough for prospective
foster or adoptive children.329
The Supreme Court's holding made it unnecessary to address other is-
sues raised by the parties, including whether Act 1 was rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose, whether it violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Arkansas Constitution, and whether the act
violated rights under the federal Constitution.33 ° (The plaintiffs cross-
appealed from the circuit court's ruling and sought a holding on these
grounds.) But the court made it clear that Act 1 infringed upon a state con-
stitutional right and that it was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
government interest of protecting children.
V. CONCLUSIONS
From these cases, one can reach a number of conclusions. The first
conclusion is one that has been written about since the Supreme Court
handed down its opinion in Picado: that the Arkansas Supreme Court is not
326. Id. at 21, __ S.W.3d at
327. Id.
328. Id. at 22, __ S.W.3d at
329. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 16 n.4, S.W.3d at _ n.4.
330. Id. at 25-26, - S.W.3d at-
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afraid to rely on its own constitution and laws to reach conclusions. In both
Picado and Cole, the court could have used federal precedent as a justifica-
tion to come to different conclusions. It did not. While the court in Picado
did not break new ground, its decision in Cole did. There were state appel-
late courts that had held that same-sex couples had a right to adopt children,
but such holdings were not in the face of a law that categorically banned
them from doing so. And while there are Florida trial courts willing to strike
down its ban on homosexuals adopting children, there is no guarantee that
such a holding will withstand appellate scrutiny. In any event, when looking
at fundamental rights, Arkansans should look to their own state's constitu-
tion.
This may mean that those in favor of advocating gay rights will see the
Arkansas judiciary as friendly to their claims. This may not be the case,
however, which leads to the second conclusion. While gays and lesbians
have benefitted from many favorable decisions over the last decade, they
were not premised upon the conclusion that gays and lesbians are a group
deserving of suspect or quasi-suspect classification. The Arkansas Supreme
Court struck down the same-sex sodomy law, in part, on equal protection
grounds, but that analysis has not really played a role in any of the state's
jurisprudence. Picado was relevant to Cole, not because of any equal-
protection implications, but because of a fundamental right to privacy that
exists regardless of one's sexual orientation. Gays and lesbians benefit be-
cause the Arkansas judiciary applies the law equally to heterosexuals and
homosexuals.
The third conclusion (or at least an extension of the second) is that the
best way for gays and lesbians to protect themselves in an Arkansas court is
to have relationships that mirror traditional relationships, as least to the ex-
tent possible. Even then, at least for now, it will not be perfect. This lesson
should be apparent from Bethany. Despite the fact that the couple there
agreed to co-parent a child, there was no legal relationship (beyond that of
in loco parentis status) between the child and the "non-biological mother."
Thus, the circuit court was unwilling to award custody. That barrier may
always exist (absent a scenario where the non-biological parent adopts the
child, which is now a possibility after Cole). The non-biological mother in
Bethany was successful because she played a substantial role in the child's
life. She may not have been successful had she simply been someone whom
the child called "mommy."
The fourth conclusion that there is still room to legally discriminate
against gays and lesbians in the Arkansas judiciary is not as positive as the
three that preceded it. This comes from the Taylor opinion. Ms. Taylor was
successful in defending the change-of-custody petition, not because the Su-
preme Court found that sexual orientation should play no role in the custody
decision, but because it felt that a custody decision should be justified by
more than erroneous public perception. What would have happened if Ms.
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Taylor was actually in a relationship with a lesbian? Would she have even
been able to win an initial custody determination had she considered herself
a lesbian at the time of the divorce? Even without evidence showing that the
parent's sexual orientation is directly harming the children at the subject of
the litigation before any given court, there is-at least at this time-room
for a court to rule against a gay or lesbian for no other reason than he or she
is gay or lesbian.
Perhaps some may take solace in a final conclusion: that despite an
animus against gays and lesbians and a constitutional amendment with for-
bids recognition of same-sex marriage, gays and lesbians in committed rela-
tionships may have some rights in Arkansas. Unless the voters repeal its
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage (which is unlikely
given public sentiment on the issue)331 or the federal courts declare it uncon-
stitutional (as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has done with re-
spect to California's marriage amendment),332 gays and lesbians will have to
rely on the judiciary in Arkansas for rights in the area of domestic relations.
But at least the option is there.
331. See note I and accompanying text.
332. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). See also Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that the federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, violated core constitutional principles of equal protection); Mas-
sachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010)
(finding that DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution). While
this article was undergoing final edits, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California also declared DOMA to be unconstitutional. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, __ F. Supp. 2d _, 2012 WL 569685 (N.D. Cal. 2012). What
distinguishes Golinski from the cases decided by the District Court in Massachusetts is its
finding that the law was subject to heightened scrutiny. A law subjected to heightened scru-
tiny violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is not substantially related to an important gov-
ernment interest. Needless to say, there will be more judicial opinions written about marriage
amendments and DOMA.
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